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ABSTRACT
In response to the many challenges faced by US airlines in the past decade, merger activity has increased
significantly. By combining their networks, airlines commonly aim to not only realize cost synergies but
also achieve revenue synergies as well through increased network coverage. In practical terms, this means
that the combined airline can cut its total capacity without reducing traffic as it benefits from a larger
network and more connecting options via its hubs.
The objective of this thesis is to find evidence to confirm this effect based on recent merger activity by
comparing both capacity and traffic data before and after the integration period. Particular emphasis is
placed on the changing role of hubs to highlight capacity and traffic shifts in a combined network.
Two of the most recent major mergers, Delta-Northwest and United-Continental, exhibit how the
networks of previously independent carriers were consolidated to achieve the above-mentioned synergies.
Delta concentrated capacity at its largest hub in Atlanta and a small number of additional hubs while other
hubs experienced a significant downsizing. Additionally, the airline also eliminated a large number of
point-to-point services that were bypassing the hubs in order to maximize the use of its hubs. United and
Continental, on the other hand, engaged in fairly minor capacity redistribution instead of sweeping
reductions. Both carriers increased the share of capacity operated by regional partners and grew capacity
between most of the hubs as well.
Over the same time frame, however, both of the combined airlines lost passengers compared to their pre-
merger levels. While exogenous factors like the recent recession and operational issues played a role,
network strategies at both airlines also affected traffic. Delta was unable to recover most of the passengers
it lost on the eliminated point-to-point services. For United, the shift towards more international capacity
indicates a displacement of domestic traffic by international connecting passengers. Although both
carriers had not returned to their pre-merger traffic levels by the end of the integration period, Delta's
2012 performance suggests that network integration and consolidation can have positive effects in the
long run.
Thesis Supervisor: Peter Belobaba
Title: Principal Research Scientist
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1. MERGERS IN THE US AIRLINE INDUSTRY: HISTORY AND OBJECTIVES
"Our combined airline will have the most comprehensive network in the industry with 370
destinations. As the world's premier airline, we will have an unmatched scope and scale that will
allow us to generate more revenue and operate the combined carrier more eficiently."
- Jeff Smisek, Continental Airlines Chairman and CEO,
- Announcing the merger with United Airlines (Mason 2010)
"The combination of Delta and Northwest will create a stronger company with route systems that
complement each other and will provide an opportunity to offer travelers a global network that
neither airline independently could offer."
- Richard Anderson, Delta Airlines CEO,
Testifying before the House Judiciary Committee (2008)
The February 2013 announcement by American Airlines and US Airways to merge and form the
world's largest airline by passenger traffic marked another major step towards consolidation in the US
airline industry. According to the Economist, it might be "the last big airline merger allowed to happen in
America" and place the roughly 80% of the US domestic market in the hands of the four largest carriers.
(The Economist 2013) Prior to American and US, the industry had already seen four major mergers in the
past decade: Delta-Northwest, United-Continental, Southwest-AirTran and US Airways-America West.
All of these mergers shared the common objective of increasing the airlines' competitiveness in the same
way Jeff Smisek and Richard Anderson envisioned for their respective companies in 2008 and 2010.
Historically, this is not the first wave of mergers in the US airline industry. According to Airlines
for America, the first merger dates back to 1930, when Western Air Express and Standard Airlines
merged. (Airlines for America 1) The first major wave took place between 1967 and 1972, when a total of
9 mergers were concluded. In the aftermath of deregulation, 1985-1993 saw by far the most extensive
phase of industry consolidation with a total of 15 mergers and acquisitions. This period culminated in the
collapse of Pan American World Airways ("Pan Am") and its subsequent breakup and mergers with Delta
and United. 2001 marked another major point in this process when the bankrupt TWA merged with
American. The timeline shows that major periods of industry consolidation generally occurred in the
context of substantial changes to the operating environment of the industry. Deregulation had a clear
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impact on the industry structure and led to the disappearance of old industry leaders and the reemergence
of new dominant players.
The current wave of mergers follows a very similar pattern given that the last decade has brought
drastic changes to the US airline industry. Low cost carriers, Internet distribution, rising fuel costs and
security threats have all contributed to what has likely been one of the most tumultuous phases in the
industry's history. Between 2001 and 2011, a total of 41 US airlines ceased operations or entered
bankruptcy protection including US Airways (2002 & 2004), United (2004), Northwest (2005), Delta
(2005) and American (2011). (Airlines for America 2) Mergers have again become a strategic response
for airlines to increase their competitiveness in the aftermath of a difficult period with lasting effects on
the industry.
Like in most merger scenarios, the companies involved aim to benefit from operational and cost
synergies while increasing revenues by offering customers better and broader services. These come in the
form of more destinations served, more available nonstop or connecting frequencies and more extensive
frequent flyer programs. As far as costs are concerned, the logic is derived from economies of scale. If
airlines are able to bundle their traffic at consolidated hubs, they can employ larger aircraft on the same
legs. Aircraft with larger seat counts have lower unit costs, primarily because fixed costs can be divided
by a larger number of units of production (ASMs). (Wei & Hansen) As far as handling costs are
concerned, the potential size of cost savings depends on the network structure of the two carriers. As
Iatrou and Oretti point out, ground activities can only be combined at airports served by both carriers.
(Iatrou & Oretti, p. 120) In the case of American and US Airways, for example, the limited network
overlap might have strategic advantages, but might lead to limited cost synergies. Whether personnel
costs for the flight and cabin crew can be reduced depends to a large degree on a successful integration of
the two workforces. Unions can effectively block this process and force the airline to maintain separate
work forces. (Iatrou & Oretti, p. 117) US Airways provides an example for this as separate labor contracts
are still maintained for the original US Airways pilots and those that used fly for America West. (Harty &
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Sloan) On the other hand, back office expenses for marketing, sales, procurement and overhead can be
reduced when overlap is eliminated. When the United-Continental merger was announced, estimates of
potential cost savings ranged around $ lb per year.
Revenue effects, on the other hand, also represent a form of economies of scale and scope
realized through a larger number of connecting options, more destinations and enhanced frequent flyer
programs. (Flint) In many cases where the networks are complimentary rather than overlapping, these
effects can be larger than those achieved through cost synergies. When Air France and KLM merged in
2004, the two CEOs emphasized that cost savings where not the primary motivation but to "bring in
traffic from beyond the local market and maintain a global reach". (Airline Business) The underlying
premise is that a larger airline will be able to attract more passengers than two smaller independent
carriers as it can instantly serve a larger number of O-D city pairs.
In the case of DL and NW, for instance, Richard Anderson pointed out in 2008 that despite being
America's "premiere carrier to Asia", it would be virtually impossible for Northwest to copy Delta's
strength in Europe, the Middle East and Latin America. (House Judiciary Committee) By combining the
resources, the airlines aimed to become a key player in all of these markets. Through integration, airlines
can go as far as creating what Goetz calls "fortress hubs" where a certain carrier controls over 60% of
traffic and thus gains significant influence over fares. (Goetz) Also on the revenue side, airlines can create
a better experience for the passenger through integration. In turn, this may contribute to increasing traffic
or, potentially, fares. Carlton, Landes and Posner mention the ability to offer more convenient schedules,
reduce walking distance between connecting flights and better coordination in the case of delays as
examples for these operational effects. (Carlton & Posner, p. 68)
Ultimately, the airlines will seek to benefit from cost synergies and revenue effects
simultaneously. By combining their networks, it should be feasible to drop unprofitable services and
downsize redundant hubs without reducing the overall quality of service. Quality of service, in this
11
context, represents a collection of choice parameters that influence a passenger's decision for a specific
itinerary. The available capacity between a city pair represents a basic but effective measure of service
quality as more service provides passengers with more choice concerning their itineraries or available
fares. Parameters such as the number of connecting points, elapsed time and individual carrier
characteristics also factor into this decision. (Clark) For the purpose of this analysis, however, it will be
assumed that capacity, measured in terms of aircraft size and frequencies, represents the key determinant
of market share.
This analysis is an effort to establish a link between how airline networks have changed over the
course of mergers and how the airline performed in terms of traffic over the same time period. As the
objective of airline mergers is to realize cost synergies and revenue effects at the same, the assumption to
be tested is that the merged carriers have consolidated their network by shifting or reducing capacity
while improving or at least maintaining their traffic performance.
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2. METHODOLOGY
The assumption introduced in Part I will be tested by comparing the situation of the independent
airlines shortly before the merger announcement with that of the combined carrier after the merger's
conclusion. A single operating certificate generally marks the point in time from which the FAA
considers the merged carrier to be a single entity so the second set of data will be based on a point in time
after this date.
Supply and demand will be analyzed separately for each case before the results will be brought
together in a brief conclusion. Airline supply equals the total available capacity an airline offers in a
particular market or, for the purposes of this study, its entire network. Available seat miles (ASM)
represent the commonly used measure of capacity. But the analysis will also include the number of
frequencies and total seats offered by each airline in order to differentiate between changing aircraft sizes,
distances and frequencies.' Since US carriers utilize small regional partners to serve many of the smaller
spoke cities in their network, using only flights operated by the mainline carriers would fall short of
delivering a comprehensive picture of the network.
2.1 The Suippy dSie Analyzing changes in capacity
After briefly quantifying the aggregate changes in capacity across the network, particular emphasis
will be placed on how the role of the individual hubs has changed during the integration of the airlines.
As the two cases to be analyzed involve traditional legacy carriers who rely significantly on hub-and-
spoke networks, this structure will deliver the best overview of how strategies have shifted during the
merger. For each hub, change will be measured according to the following metrics:
- Total capacity offered in terms of ASMs
- Domestic and international capacity by geographic region
1 The data analyzed in this report is sourced from Innovata LLCs Schedule Reference Service (SRS) and the US
DOT 10% Ticket Sample Database. Both the SRS and DOT data were accessed through the DIo Mi Market
Intelligence portal
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e Number of flights and seats offered
* Number of nonstop destinations available
- Intra-hub capacity
e Capacity shares of mainline and regional carriers
In order to determine the viability of the hubs in a combined network, their geographic position
relative to the other hubs will also be taken into consideration. As Toh and Higgins point out, smaller
hubs that are too close to the larger ones cannot be competitive. They use the example of St Louis, which
in TWA's network was "sandwiched" between Chicago and Dallas. (Toh & Higgins) Considering that
most US airlines already operate multi-hub networks, a merged carrier will start out with a large number
of hubs with substantial geographic overlap. Based on these considerations and the above-mentioned
metrics, a brief conclusion will evaluate which hubs will likely be phased out over time.
2 2 The Demnand Side How has trafic changed over the same period oftime?
To determine how any changes in capacity can be related to demand, the second part of the
analysis will focus on the combined airline's traffic performance compared to what each airline carried
before the merger. Naturally, actual traffic does not reflect the true demand in a market as passengers may
be spilled from a flight that does not offer enough capacity. Nonetheless, overall traffic performance can
reflect how capacity changes have affected demand as well as the relative attractiveness of the service.
The underlying assumption of this analysis states that airlines can consolidate their networks and shift
capacity without negative repercussions on their traffic performance. So a relatively constant or
increasing number of passengers over the same period of time would support this hypothesis.
The data will be compared based on the same points in time that were used in the previous
section. As opposed to the schedule data, traffic data is not available as a comprehensive data set covering
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all airlines and regions. Instead, the analysis will use the 10% ticket sample collected by the US DOT for
domestic markets. This represents the most reliable source of information about traffic performance in the
United States. Since this data is only available for domestic flights, the analysis will focus on these
markets. To relate this data to the hub-level analysis in the previous section, the demand analysis will
focus on differentiating local from connecting passengers. The primary emphasis will be placed on
geographical patterns to show how traffic to and from different parts of the country has changed and
relate these changes to the capacity changes identified in the previous section.
The analysis will also contain another approach to infer what kind of markets lost or gained
passengers. Markets can be differentiated by whether nonstop service was dropped, added or whether the
kind of service did not change. While this method does not account for changing frequencies, it will
provide insights into which of these changes had the most significant impact on traffic.
Lastly, the demand side analysis will examine how the top 1,000 domestic O-D markets before
the merger have changed over the course of the merger. This part of the analysis will differentiate
between city pairs involving one or two hubs and non-hub markets and take a closer look at how capacity
cuts in point-to-point markets by-passing the hubs have affected traffic.
2.3 Conclusioin Bringing everything togiether
In the conclusion, the results of both analyses will be combined to evaluate whether the
underlying assumption advanced in part I holds true. Complications will potentially arise from different
external circumstances such as the general economic climate during the merger. The analysis will attempt
to account for such factors, but it should be noted that the findings of this study might nonetheless be
biased due to these influences.
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3. THE DELTA-NORTHWEST MERGER
3.1 The Supplp Side - Consolidation and re-alignment of DL-NW hubs durin' the merger
The first case study that to be analyzed is the merger between Delta Airlines and Northwest
Airlines. This merger represents the most suitable starting point as it initiated the most recent
consolidation process within the US airline industry and because it has been fully concluded at this point.
Both carriers officially announced Delta's acquisition of its rival Northwest in April of 2008. (Isidore)
The merger was officially concluded in January 2010 when the new Delta Airlines emerged as a single
entity. (Mouawad 2011) Based on this timeframe, the analysis of the changing route structure was
performed by comparing schedule snapshots from May 2007 and May 2010. For this purpose, all flights
marketed by either of the two carriers were considered including all regional partners that were flying on
behalf of Delta or Northwest.
Figure 3-1 shows the aggregate total capacity of all flights marketed by Delta and Northwest in
terms of available seat miles. Overall, capacity decreased by roughly 1.2b ASMs (or 6%) from 2007 to
2010, but virtually all of these cuts occurred in domestic markets while international capacity remained
nearly constant. This represents a first hint at a network consolidation strategy designed to reduce overlap
in domestic markets and take advantage of the revenue and cost synergies explained in part 1.
Figure 3-1: Total Network ASMs in May (marketed by DL & NW)
Domestic
2007 2W 8.695 20,728
International
2010 8,668 19,540
1 z C D 2ns
Moll-iins
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In order to better understand these effects, it is useful to look deeper into the two airlines'
network structure. As traditional legacy carriers, both Delta and Northwest organize their network around
a hub-and-spoke system with multiple hub locations. This analysis will focus on the hubs in Atlanta
(ATL), Cincinnati (CVG), Detroit (DTW), Memphis (MEM), Minneapolis-St. Paul (MSP), New York-
JFK (JFK) and Salt Lake City (SLC), which have been identified as primary domestic hubs for Delta and
Northwest. New York-LaGuardia (LGA), will also be considered due to substantial capacity buildup at
this airport. (Delta Airlines)
Under the assumption that a combined carrier will seek to rationalize its network, exploit
potential synergies and promote economies of scale, the focus will be placed on how the role of the major
hubs has changed. Naturally, large network carriers also tend to operate point-to-point services outside its
major hubs. For the purpose of this analysis, however, these services will not be considered as hub-and-
spoke networks offer a higher potential for synergies. During the integration of the two airlines, these
eight primary hubs have changed substantially with regards to their strategic positioning within the
combined network. As expected, capacity has been moved between these hubs to achieve better
centralization and meet new geographic priorities. To simplify, these adjustments can be grouped into
three broad categories:
1. Strengthened primary hubs
a. ATL - Primary hub in the combined network
b. JFK - International gateway geared towards larger aircraft
c. LGA - Access point to New York City for domestic markets
2. Downsizing and strategic re-alignment of smaller hubs
a. SLC - Reduced domestic hub with long-haul service to Skyteam hubs
b. DTW - More domestic frequencies and limited international capacity
c. MSP - Shrinking hub with selected long-haul international service
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3. General downsizing
a. MEM - Downsized hub with increased regional carrier presence
b. CVG - Rapid hub downsizing across the board
The initial analysis will take place on an aggregate level to sum up changes in capacity, flights,
destinations and operating carriers at these hubs. These insights will serve to highlight the principal
changes in Delta-Northwest's combined network before moving on to an individual analysis of the hubs.
The primary objective at the individual hub level will be to identify certain geographic and operational
patterns that better illustrate increases or decreases of capacity at a hub.
3. 1.1 Aggregae analy'sis of capacity, flights, destinations and operating carriers by hub
When looking at the 8 airports side by side, there appears to be a clear tendency towards shifting
network capacity, strengthening some hubs and reducing the size of others. Figure 3-2 shows that ATL
has become even more important as central hub in the network as total capacity has increased, including
to the other hubs. JFK/LGA represent the strongest local hub market with an emphasis on long- and short-
haul services respectively. These 3 hubs were the only ones to see overall capacity increases during this
time period.
Figure 3-2: Total ASMs by Hub
2007
I.uUu
2010
t. UIo
UJS M
ATL JFK MSP DTW SLC M EM CVG LGA
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Capacity at SLC, DTW and MSP has decreased, but they retain international long-haul
connections to partner hubs along with a sizable domestic feeder network. At these airports, a significant
proportion of domestic capacity has been shifted to the regional partners, which in turn contributed to
smaller average aircraft sizes. CVG and MEM have very limited hub function after sweeping cuts in
capacity, frequency and markets served.
Along with capacity, the number of total flights has also increased at ATL as exhibited in Figure
3-3. In most of the other cases, this number declined along with capacity. In the case of DTW and JFK, a
reverse trend points towards decreasing (DTW) and increasing aircraft sizes (JFK) respectively.
Figure 3-3: Total Flights by Hub
2007
[2010
44 -
3C
2C
IC
ATL DTW MSP SLC MEM JFK CVG LGA
Other than the NYC airports, all hubs have seen the number of non-hub destinations served
decrease between 2007 and 2010. Evidence is shown in Figure 3-4. Even ATL is serving fewer cities than
before. Of the hubs that have undergone the most significant downsizing, CVG has seen the largest drop
in destinations served with a reduction of almost 50%. At the other hubs, this number has either remained
constant or decreased by a smaller proportion.
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Figure 3-4: Number of non-hub Destinations by Hub
2007
200 a 2010
2CC
ATL DTW MSP JFK SLC MEM CVG LGA
In summary, ATL is offering more flights and more capacity to fewer destinations while most of
the other hubs (except in New York) have seen capacity, frequencies and destinations reduced. This
points towards increased centralization and a shift of connecting capacity to ATL, in line with the basic
rationale of economies of scale and exploiting revenue as well as cost synergies. JFK and LGA represent
special cases because of their strong local market. Further evidence of centralization can be found in the
increasing role of regional partners compared to mainline operations at most of the smaller hubs.
Figure 3-5: Share of Flights operated by Regional Partners per Hub
2007 - 2010
MEM CVG SLC LGA LTW MSP ATL JF
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The comparison of how many flights were operated by mainline vs. regional partner carriers in
Fig. 3-5 shows strong relative gains by the regional carriers at most of the downsized hubs. MSP, DTW
and MEM have all seen the share of regional partner flights go up by at least 20 percentage points, SLC
by 2. Despite the overall capacity increase at LGA, regional carriers have also become more important at
this airport with an increase of 14 percentage points.
JFK has recorded the strongest decrease in the share of regional partners (-15 percentage points).
ATL's share has remained relatively constant while CVG has also seen this share shrink (-5 percentage
points), due mainly to the previously large presence of regional carriers, which subsequently had to bear a
substantial amount of the capacity cuts.
To sum up, it is clear that Delta Airlines has combined its existing hubs with the Northwest
Airlines hubs as part of their merger and moved capacity between them. ATL, JFK and LGA have grown
during this process with different regional priorities while all other hubs have experienced cuts in
capacity, frequencies and destinations. The airline has also moved a significant proportion of its flights to
its regional partners with more favorable cost structures. This trend can be observed at virtually all of the
downsized hubs and, to a certain extent, at ATL and LGA. In order to evaluate the role of the downsized
hubs in particular, we have to look at the changes at the individual airport level and account for any
regional variations.
3.1.2A: AL Primary hub in the combined network_
The merger has strengthened ATL's position as primary hub in Delta's domestic and international
network. Both the increasing number of flights as well the overall capacity growth (ASMs) in Table 3-1
attest to this fact.
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Table 3-1: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at ATL
Domestic 47,607 51,835 +9% 3,949,319 3,960,481 +0%
International 5,102 4,880 -4% 2,699,690 2,815,810 +4%
TOTAL 52,709 56,715 +8%!/ 6,649,009 6,776,291 +2%
Capacity from ATL has increased across the board, both to domestic as well as international
destinations. In international markets, the decreasing number of frequencies means that seat capacity per
aircraft increased over the same time period. This is shown in Table 3-2
Table 3-2: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at ATL
Domestic 5,187 5,1554 +7 109 107 -2%
Intl. 854 847 -1%0/ 167 173 +41%
TOTAL 6,041 6,401 +6% 115 113 -2%
Along with the increasing average aircraft size on an international level, aircraft capacity slightly
decreased domestically. Considering the substantial increase in domestic frequencies coupled with a
modest rise in ASMs, average stage lengths on domestic routes must have decreased. The visualization of
domestic capacity changes between 2007 and 2010 in Figure 3-6 confirms this assessment.
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Figure 3-6: Change in ATL hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
There have been significant capacity increases from ATL to markets in the Midwest, South and
Southeast. At the same time, there were reductions in the longer haul routes to the West Coast, Alaska
and Hawaii. The realignment has also manifested itself in the relationship to the other hubs. ATL now
offers more capacity to each of them, thus providing further evidence of hub consolidation, where
connecting options have shifted to the primary hub. As capacity has declined at the other hubs, their local
markets in particular have to rely more heavily on ATL to provide connecting options, particularly to
international destinations. Table 3-3 shows these changes.
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Table 3-3: ATL intra-hub capacity
-lub 2007ASMs per month -A rC
148,596,924
111,440,079
78,740,460
55,825,902
38,897,560
22,339,948
19,834,275
150,060,393
129,196,492
97,520,934
63,425,538
50,123,520
23,173,600
22,541,882
+1%
+ 4 6 %fw
+24%
+29 '%
+4%!
+14%)/(
As far as international routes are concerned, the increased aircraft size is also accompanied by
increasing stage lengths. The strongest capacity growth took place in the long distance markets to Asia,
Africa and the Middle East while capacity to Europe saw significant cuts. Figure 3-7 shows the exact
distribution.
Figure 3-7: Change in ATL hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
-10% 
-18%/
+20
-10% +292
+4%
When looking at the European destinations in detail in Table 3-4, capacity to France and the
Netherlands has actually increased. From a strategic point of view, Delta appears to rely more on its
24
SLC
LGA
MSP
DTW
JFK
MEM
CVG
Skyteam partner AF-KLM to distribute its European traffic beyond these hubs. In addition, most of
Delta's other hubs have retained at least some connections to these European hubs. Since the Skyteam
network in Europe is so dense, Delta can take advantage of the alliance and focus on serving other long-
haul destinations from ATL.
Table 3-4: Change in ATL Capacity to Destinations in Europe (in m ASMs)
Germany Russia Italy UK Denmark France Netherland Greece
S
-101 -68 -62 -56 -18 +7 10 + 19
Table 3-5 shows ASM hub capacity by operating carrier. At the top, the grey shaded lines show
the change in aggregate capacity operated by Delta-Northwest mainline as well as its regional partners.
More detailed information about which carriers specifically grew or declined is provided in the lines
below. Mainline Delta has increased its overall capacity while regional partners have decreased despite a
growing share of total flights at ATL. This corresponds to larger share of international long-haul flights
for the mainline and the shifts towards shorter-haul domestic flights regional partners.
Table 3-5: ATL Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
DL/NW mainline 5,901,4116 5,988,836 +1%OY
Regional partners 747,593 696,347 -7%
ExpressJet 572,272 491,103 -81,168
Pinnacle 0 103,011 103,0 1
Shuttle America 42,948 35,620 -7,327
Comair 21,159 24,370 +3,211
Mesaba 0 21,281 +21,281
Compass 0 20,962 +20,962
SkyWest 75,948 0 -75,948
Freedom Airlines 35,267 0 -35,267
To sum up, ATL has become a stronger central hub with a slight geographic reorientation.
Capacity has increased substantially including to the other hubs. The map shows substantial growth in the
Eastern United States and most of the international long-haul markets. It is clear that Delta continues to
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build up its largest hub in order to maximize available connecting. The airport serves as primary gateway
to the South and Southeast as well as virtually all international long-haul markets outside of Europe and
the Skyteam hubs. Through this continued growth, Delta improves its ability to create the economies of
scale described in part 1.
3.1.2B: JFK Internaiional gateway geared towards larger aircraft
Along with Atlanta, JFK has benefited the most from Delta's hub realignment during the merger.
There has been substantial capacity growth in both domestic and international markets. Table 3-6 shows
these changes. Domestic frequencies, however, have been cut substantially, which points towards larger
aircraft sizes and possibly longer stage lengths. The number of non-hub markets served increased from 73
to 86.
Table 3-6: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at JFK
Domestic 7,640 6,035 -21% 719,449 830,731 +15%
International 2,014 2,360 +171% 1,252,380 1,710,122 +37%
TOTAL 9,654 8,395 -13% 1,971,829 2,540,854 +29%
Table 3-7 shows how average aircraft capacity has grown on domestic as well as international
routes. This corresponds with capacity growth that is largely focused on long-haul markets and allows
Delta to move more passengers at this highly congested airport.
Table 3-7: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at JFK
Domestic 618 597 -3% 81 99 +22%
International 339 448 +32% 168 190 +13%
TOTAL 958 1,045 +9'% 99 125 + 26%
Figure 3-8 shows the domestic market, where Delta has substantially grown its capacity from JFK
to the West Coast while keeping most of its short-haul capacity relatively constant.
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Figure 3-8: Change in JFK Hub Capacity between May 2007 and 2010
6'iox
3~t~
~,2K j~'
104Y
42%
29%
Intra-hub capacity, as exhibited in Table 3-8, has been further concentrated on the 3 largest
routes, with direct service now added to Memphis. With this service, JFK offers connections to all of the
hubs in other parts of the country, which emphasizes the airport's bigger role as international hub in the
network.
Table 3-8: JFK intra-hub capacity
-007 ASMs per month 
_2010 ASMs per month
SLC
ATL
MSP
DTW
CVG
MEM
66,981,564
38,897,560
25,264,128
13,906,400
10,937,730
0
84,413,160
50,123,520
26,291,100
12,451,080
9,107,118
4,542,388
+26%
+4%
-10%
-17%
N E WN
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Delta has strengthened JFK as an international gateway to virtually all parts of the world. Much
like ATL, the airport has seen significant capacity growth to Africa and the Middle East along with
additional growth to Asia, South America and the Caribbean. This is shown in Figure 3-9. It appears that
JFK has also taken over most of the European capacity shed by ATL. Given the geographic proximity,
Delta has made a logical move to minimize circuity on these routes and bundle traffic at point where
transatlantic and other international traffic can be bundled easily. For large parts of the United States, JFK
represents a convenient transfer point for these routes. Conversely, JFK represents an important gateway
to North America for passengers coming from Europe. Delta also offers direct service to additional
Skyteam hubs in Europe such as Rome, Prague and Moscow, thereby increasing the number of available
beyond connections particularly in Eastern and Southern Europe. In this context, the geographic
positioning can be compared to United's hub in EWR.
Figure 3-9: Change in JFK hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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The distribution of capacity by operating carrier in Table 3-9 aligns with the overall picture as
Delta's share has increased substantially while the total capacity provided by regional partners has
shrunk. The mainline carrier operates international services and larger aircraft.
Table 3-9: JFK Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
DL/NW mainline 1,862,894 2,422,638
Regional partners 108,935 94,556 -13%
Comair 58,864 76,650 +j7,787
Chautauqua 9,163 8,324 -839
Pinnacle 0 4,449 +4,750
Mesaba 0 4,158 4,158
Compass 0 684 +684
Shuttle America 24,156 0 -24,156
Freedom Airlines 16,752 0 -16,752
JFK clearly has become Delta's international gateway on the East Coast. Strong capacity growth
by the mainline, increased aircraft sizes and the increasing share of international flights all contribute to
this assessment. Furthermore, the airline has underlined its long-term plans for the airport with a $1.2
billion investment in expanding capacity on the ground. (Gannon) In early 2013, the airline announced an
additional $175 million investment to increase gate capacity. (Atlanta Business Chronicle)
The strategic orientation of JFK makes sense as it takes advantage of the geographic location
while providing access to the New York City local market. With this international gateway, Delta has
entered into direct competition with United-Continental (EWR) and American (JFK) over this lucrative
market and offers multiple connecting options on both ends to its Skyteam partners. Judging by the recent
capital investments, it is clear that the airline intends to become the dominant player.
3.1.2C;_ LGA - Access point to New York City fbr domestic markeis
New York-LaGuardia does not represent a classical hub within the Delta-Northwest network.
Even in 2010, the airport recorded only 279 daily connecting passengers compared to, for instance, 2,028
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at CVG. Since New York City has such a strong local market, the observed buildup in capacity at LGA
should be interpreted as an effort increase Delta's share in this important market. Offering connections is
not the primary objective of the airline, especially considering the strict capacity constraints at the airport.
Along with the strengthening of long-haul domestic routes from JFK, Delta has bolstered domestic
capacity out of LGA. One of the major steps in this process was the 2011 swap of slot pairs with US
Airways, which lead to a net increase of 116 slot pairs for Delta at LGA. (Credeur)Table 3-10 shows that
the airline added almost 800 monthly frequencies between 2007 and 2010 and thereby increased capacity
by almost 25%.
Table 3-10: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at LGA
Domestic 5,699 6,492 +14% 282,948 360,491 +27%
International 112 107 -4% 15,018 8,016 -47%
TOTAL 5,811 6,599 + 14 297,966 368,508 +24%
The average number of seats, as shown in Table 3-11, decreased as narrow bodies appear to have
been replaced with more regional jets. International flying at LGA is limited to short-haul only and
therefore primarily concerns Canada, which explains an even stronger reduction in aircraft capacity in
these markets.
Table 3-11: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at LGA
Domestic 521 558 +7% 91 86 -5%
Intl. 16 9 -44% 146 81 -45%
TOTAL 538 566 +5'4 93 86 -8%
The map of capacity changes in Figure 3-10 clearly shows a focus on growth in markets east of
the Mississippi with virtually no domestic capacity cuts. So it appears that while strengthening New York
as a whole, Delta aimed to operate longer stage length domestic and international flights from JFK while
shorter haul markets grew out of LGA.
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Figure 3-10: Change in LGA hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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Intra-hub capacity in Table 3-12 shows significant growth to ATL, but cuts to all other hubs.
Given the overall capacity increases, this points towards a shift towards more direct domestic services that
used to be routed via the other hubs. In fact, the number of direct non-hub markets has increased from 29
to 34. Furthermore, it provides additional evidence for the consolidation of hub activity at ATL.
Table 3-12: LGA intra-hub capacity
-2007 ASMs per month 2010 ASMs per month C
111,400,079
66,663,120
41,124,084
21,848,544
22,797,450
129,196,492
55,337,040
38,208,264
21,157,110
13,910,715
The emphasis on growing short-haul routes with smaller aircraft is further illustrated in Table 3-
13 by the fact that the regional partners account for over half of the overall capacity growth at LGA
between 2007 and 2010.
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Table 3-13: LGA Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
Shuttle America 30,160 46,946 +16,786
Pinnacle 7,719 24,729 +17 010
Mesaba 0 12,491 12.491
Chautauqua 938 8,324 10429
Northwest 3,559 0 -3,559
ExpressJet 3,085 0 -3,085
Overall, the picture at LGA is very similar compared to JFK with capacity growth based on a
strong local market. Domestic capacity and frequencies to the Eastern half of the United States have
increased while aircraft sizes have decreased slightly and regional partners make up a higher share of total
capacity. LaGuardia's increased importance in Delta's network is also reflected by a substantial
infrastructure investment. Similar to JFK, the airline is investing $160 million in renovating the facilities
at LGA to handle increasing traffic and improve the customer experience. (Delta Airlines)
3.1.3A: SLC Recduced domestic hub with long-haul service lo Skyteam hubs
Beyond Atlanta and the New York City airports, the other hubs in the Delta-Northwest network
now play a smaller role than before the merger. Table 3-14 shows that Salt Lake City is one of the
airports that have seen cuts in domestic capacity and frequencies. On the international level, ASMs nearly
doubled but the number of flights decreased by over 50% due to a focus on partner hubs, which will be
analyzed in more detail later in this section.
Table 3-14: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at SLC
Domestic 16,436 14,978 -9% 1,086,355 891,445 -18%
International 804 378 -53% 71,525 133,245 +86%
TOTAL 17,240 15,356 -11% 1,157,880 1,024,691 -12%
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Along with the number of flights, total seat capacity was also reduced across domestic and
international destinations. Average domestic aircraft size has stayed virtually constant at a level that
reflects a significant proportion of regional aircraft. This is shown in Table 3-15. Due to a shift towards
limited long-haul services, this metric has increased on the international level.
Table 3-15: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at SLC
Domestic 1,295 1,189 -8% 79 79 0%
Intl. 63 45 -29% 78 118
TOTAL 1,358 1,234 -9% 79 80
Figure 3-11 shows no clear regional pattern in the capacity changes from SLC, other than that
most of the reductions have taken place in the most populous states (CA, TX, FL, IL, OH, NY, VA, NC).
Some states have also seen capacity increases, mainly in the Northwest and on other short-haul routes
from SLC.
Figure 3-11: Change in SLC hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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Capacity grew to most of the hubs in Delta's network as demonstrated in Table 3-16. Given the
overall capacity cuts from the airport, it is evident that the airport is losing importance as a hub and that
previous non-stop services are being re-routed via other hubs. The total number of non-stop markets
served has also declined from 99 to 82.
Table 3-16: SLC intra-hub capacity
-007 ASMs per ionth 2010 ASIs per -onth Cha ge
ATL 148,596,924 150,060,393 +
JFK 66,981,564 84,413,160 +
DTW 12,233,060 55,143,554
MSP 45,546,360 48,323,142
CVG 70,396,050 36,319,600 -48%
Along with the overall cuts, Table 3-17 shows a shift of domestic capacity from mainline Delta to
its regional partners. This aligns with the growth of some of the short-haul markets from SLC.
Table 3-17: SLC Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
Mesaba 0 30,393 +30,393
ExpressJet 18,167 0 1-18,167
As far as international service is concerned, the strong growth in capacity and average aircraft
sizes is due to the new routes introduced to the partner hub at CDG and Northwest's Japan hub at NRT.
These require larger aircraft, thus accounting for the increase in average aircraft capacity on the
international level. Other international service to Mexico and Canada has been reduced. Overall, the
importance of SLC as a hub in Delta's network has decreased during the merger. The airport ranked
among the smaller hubs even before the merger and provides a focal point for Delta's operations West of
the Mississippi. As capacity was shifted to short-haul markets operated by regional carriers, this strategic
role has been reinforced. Replacing existing international flights with services to partner hubs put SLC in
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the position of reliever for the main international gateways in order to offer easier connections to the
Western United States. Its unique geographic position allows SLC to maintain a viable hub with attractive
connecting options despite of the capacity cuts that have already been undertaken. Whether Delta will
continue the downsizing of SLC and instead increase service to the region from its other hubs remains to
be seen.
3. 1.3B DTW More domestic r-equenc with limtned internaional capact
The DTW hub has seen capacity cuts across the board, both in domestic as well as international
markets. As a former Northwest hub, this adjustment is tied to the shift of capacity to ATL, the primary
hub in the combined network. This is most obvious in the international markets, where the airport lost all
of its long-haul flights to Europe and Asia and instead grew capacity to Central America and the
Caribbean. On the domestic front,; minor capacity cuts have been accompanied by an increase in
frequencies, as shown in Table 3-18.
Table 3-18: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at DTW
Domestic 24,933 26,321 +6'70 1,4/3,3u1 1,43-3,/JU -1'70
International 2,153 2,009 -7% 1,245,691 879,485 -29%
TOTAL 27,086 28,530 +/% 2,720,992 2,333,215 -14%
Table 3-19 shows how average aircraft capacity has decreased for both domestic and international
flights. This is due to the reduced international long-haul markets and a shift towards regional carriers to
operate domestic routes.
Table 3-19: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at DTW
-Sat (00s Avg Set eArrf
Domestic 2,333 2,107 -10% 94 79 -16%
Intl. 336 253 -25% 156 126 -19%
TOTAL 2,669 2,360 -12% 99 83 -16%
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Most of the domestic capacity cuts took place in markets east of the Mississippi with some
growth in the Southwest, the Plains and Florida. Figure 3-13 shows the map of domestic capacity
changes. The number of non-hub markets served has remained relatively stable (133 vs. 134) over the
same time frame.
Figure 3-12: Change in DTW hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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The international map in figure 3-13 shows substantial cuts in long haul services to Europe and
Asia. Nonetheless, Delta maintains direct service to major hubs like AMS, CDG, FRA and NRT along
with a new route to China (PVG). In addition, capacity grew slightly to the Caribbean and Central
America. All in all, the downsizing of DTW's hub functions is apparent but the airport retained its status
as an international gateway, particularly with service to partner hubs.
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Figure 3-13: Change in DTW hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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Capacity to the other hubs, seen in table 3-20, has also decreased substantially in most cases.
ATL was strengthened as primary gateway. Additionally, there was a substantial increase in capacity to
SLC, which offers connections to the West Coast and beyond.
Table 3-20: DTW intra-hub capacity
Hub 2007 ASMs per month 2010 ASMs per month Cag
ATL
SLC
MSP
LGA
MEM
JFK
CVG
55,825,902
12,233,060
80,743,872
41,124,084
35,455,030
13,906,500
7,511,200
63,425,538
55,143,554
45,752,256
38,208,264
19,723,740
12,451,080
4,697,935
v4%
-43%)
-44%<1
10%
-37%)('
Not all of the previous NW mainline capacity was shifted to the combined Delta. A large portion
of this came from the dropped long-haul services. Table 3-21 shows this clearly. Regional carriers have
become significantly more important at DTW. This corresponds to the reduction in average aircraft sizes.
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Table 3-21: DTW Hub Canacitv by C
Shuttle America 0 640 +640
Pinnacle 176,773 174,987 1 786
Mesaba 28,289 84,931 +56.642
Chautauqua 0 21,803 +1,_803
Compass 0 43,526 +43%526
Freedom Airlines 0 26,700 +26.700
Similar to what happened in SLC, DTW has seen its capacity as a hub decline over the course of
the merger integration process. Again, the shift did not equal a complete downsizing but a strategic re-
alignment of the airport in terms of operations and geographic focus. Domestic capacity only saw
marginal reductions, but the share of regional carriers at the airport doubled. In this context, average
aircraft size decreased as narrow bodies were replaced with smaller regional jets. In turn, the number of
frequencies actually increased. As far as geography is concerned, capacity cuts have primarily affected
the East while there has been growth to many Western states. So growth took place in markets that saw
capacity decline from ATL and LGA, which indicates a focus on cross-country connections at the airport.
DTW also had its international capacity shrink, but the airport maintains direct service to major Skyteam
hubs.
So while DTW experienced some downsizing, it remains a key hub for Delta based on its
geographical position for cross-country connections and a local market that will remain important as long
as Detroit represents the heart of the US car industry. The airport therefore has inherent strengths that
should position it well for future rounds of capacity cuts within the network.
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3. 1 3C: MP' Shrinking hub with long-haul service to Sktean hubs
The situation at MSP is comparable to DTW in that it used to be a major hub for Northwest and
thus experienced domestic cuts in capacity as well as frequency. Table 3-22 shows this. International
flying, on the other hand, has increased. The total number of non-hub markets served, however, has also
decreased from 133 to 122. Overall, the cuts in domestic markets were limited, but affected virtually all
parts of the network.
Table 3-22: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at MSP
Domestic 22,824 21,685 -51%> 1,979,1745 1,747,1720 -121%
International 1,651 2,060 +2% 567,291 602,1951+6
TOTAL 24,475 23,745 -3% 2,547,036 2,350,670
As Table 3-23 shows, Delta now operates smaller aircraft on average, which is in part due to the
higher proportion of capacity operated by the regional partners.
Table 3-23: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at MSP
Domestic 2,1332 2,08 -14% 102 93 -9%/
International 216 233 +-8%1t 131 113 -14%
TOTAL 2,548 2,240 - 12%"/ 104 94 -10%o
Domestic capacity cuts have taken place to nearly all states except for small pockets in the South
and Southwest. Figure 3-14 also reflects the growing connecting options in the aftermath of the merger,
particularly via ATL.
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Figure 3-14: Change in MSP hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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As in the other cases of shrinking hubs, Table 3-24 shows intra-hub capacity between MSP and
ATL increasing substantially while it was reduced to almost all other hubs.
Table 3-24: MSP intra-hub capacity
Hb2007"1 ASMs per month 201 0 ASMs per month Change
ATL 78,740,460 97,520,934 24%
LGA 66,663,120 55,337,040 -17%
SLC 45,546,360 48,323,142 +
DTW 80,743,872 45,752,256 -43%
JFK 24,264,128 26,291,100 +4'
MEM 45,629,500 25,433,100 -44O
CVG 15,378,720 11,944,776 -?22
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Mainline Delta took over the majority of the previous Northwest capacity, but regional partners
also picked up a significant proportion. These are listed in Table 3-25. Regional carriers almost tripled
their capacity from MSP.
Table 3-25: MSP Hub Capacity by Operatina Carrier
Regional partners 166,633 462,834 +178%
Compass 5,448 163,335
Mesaba 26,446 149,506 +123,059
SkyWest 0 58,745 +38i74
Pinnacle 134,738 52,323 -82.416
Comair 0 35,402 402
Freedom Airlines 0 2,439 +43
ExpressJet 0 1,084 0_4
Concerning long-haul international service, MSP has seen a development similar to SLC with a
focus on the major Skyteam hubs in Europe and Asia. Delta has also replaced Northwest's LGW service
with a direct flight to LHR. This underlines the strategy to use the smaller hubs as reliever for ATL to
service traffic that does not necessarily need to flow through the primary hub. The Skyteam hubs offer
enough beyond connections to make a direct long-haul service viable combined with local feeders at
MSP. And geographically, MSP is well positioned to bundle traffic from the Eastern United States to
Asia or from the Western states to Europe. For example, domestic capacity has increased the most to
markets in the Southwest and Florida. A look at the great circle distances in figure 3-15 reveals that MSP
represents a convenient connecting point for both regions towards the East and West respectively.
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Figure 3-15: Nonstop and Hub Routes
(Source: Great Circle Mapper, wvww.jgcmap.com)
Overall, MSP shows similar trends as SLC and DTW. Domestic service was reduced, but the cuts
do not threaten the basic hub function. Regional carriers have become a lot more important and
subsequently contributed to reduced average aircraft sizes. The airport still offers direct long-haul services
to major partner hubs and the total number of destinations has decreased by only about 10%. Considering
its geographic advantages, MSP is in a good position to remain part of the future Delta network to relieve
ATL and offer convenient connections to a select group of markets. The only certainty pertains to the
relatively similar profile of DTW and MSP, but for now both appear viable side-by-side.
3 1. 4A: MEM - Downsized hub with increased regional carrier presence
The Memphis hub used to be the smallest Northwest hub prior to the merger. During the initial network
reorganization, MEM has seen cuts across the board in terms of frequencies, overall capacity and aircraft
sizes as exhibited in Table 3-26. Since it started from a very low base, the cuts further undermine its
status as a hub. Proportionally, the international markets were reduced to a very small presence in MEM.
The number overall number of non-hub markets served stayed relatively constant at 79 compared to the
previous 81.
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in Number of Flights and total ASMs at MEM
Domestic 12,060 11,375 -6% 478,331 440,211 -8%
International 344 216 -37% 112,282 73,670 -34%
TOTAL 12,404 11,591 -7% 590,613 513,981 -13%
Substantial changes occurred with regards to the average aircraft size, which was
from an already small base. This is shown in Table 3-27.
Table 3-27: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at MEM
Domestic 865 727 -16% 72 64 -11
International 48 27 -441% 139 113 -19%/4
TOTAL 913 754 -17'%/1 74 65 - 12%'/
reduced further
Capacity was cut primarily along the East Coast with moderate increases in the West and Texas.
The proximity to ATL is a problem for MEM and the reductions in the East coincide with ATL's gains in
the same geographic area. Figure 3-15 demonstrates these changes.
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Figure 3-15: Change in MEM hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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Intra-hub capacity, shown in Table 3-28, has also been cut to 4 of the other hubs, with only A TL,
JFK and SLC seeing growth. As in other cases, connecting options were moved to the primary hubs.
Given Memphis' location, it is natural for connections via SLC to increase as it offers less circuitous
connections to the West than ATL. MSP remained the most important intra-hub route for MEM, but
capacity was cut significantly compared to Northwest's old network.
Table 3-28: MEM intra-hub capacity
Hub 2~007 ASMs per month 200 ASMs per month Cag
MSP 45,629,500 25,433,100 -44%
A TL 22,339,948 23,173,00+4
LGA 21,1848,544 21,157,110-3
DTW 35,455,1030 19,723,740 -44%
SLC 4,791,800 16,771,300
JFK 0 4,542,368NEW
CVG 5,1227,-716 3,812,380 -7
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Similar to DTW and MSP, Northwest's capacity at MEM has only partially been compensated by
mainline Delta. There has been significant growth of capacity among the regional partners, which now
account for almost half of the total capacity marketed by Delta. Table 3-29 lists the carriers.
Table 3-29: MEM Hub Caoacitv by Operatine Carrier
DL/NW mainline 429,687 272,499 -37%
Regional partners 160,926 241,482 +50%
Pinnacle 146,064 129,595 -16.469
Mesaba 14,862 53,718 3
ExpressJet 0 32,008 '32 008
Compass 0 13,375 +37
Chautauqua 0 10,079 10.079
Comair 0 2,587 +2,587
Freedom Airlines 0 120 +1 20
Figure 3-16: Change in MEM hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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International routes, shown in Figure 3-16, were cut significantly with long-haul service only
available to KLM's hub at ATL, but with less capacity than before the merger. The only other remaining
international routes are to leisure markets in Mexico and the Caribbean. This shows that out of all the
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previous Northwest hubs, MEM is the most likely to be phased out in the future due to its location and
relatively small size. Especially the proximity to ATL at around 300 miles makes it very unlikely that the
combined airline will sustain the hub in the long run.
3.1.4B: CG - Rapid hub downsizing cross the board
Of all the hubs, CVG has recorded the largest relative drop in capacity and frequencies. These
affected all regions, domestic as well as international. The number of non-hub markets served has
dropped from 111 to 61. Given the geographic proximity to DTW, this can be interpreted as clear
evidence of consolidation to eliminate what essentially represents a duplicated structure. Internationally,
the only exception in terms of capacity was CDG, which as a key partner hub has actually seen increased
service from CVG. Table 3-30 shows this.
Table 3-30: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at CVG
Domestic 19,335 7,153 -63% 893,096 390,024 -56%
Intl. 724 307 -58% 218,033 106,754 -51%
TOTAL 20,059 7,460 -63% 1,111,128 496,778 -55%
Average seats per aircraft, listed in Table 3-31, increased on the domestic level, but they
remained at a very low level due to the heavy use of regional jets by Delta's partners.
Table 3-31: Chanee in Number of Seats and ave. Seats Der Aircraft at CVG
Domestic 1,257 506 -60% 65 71 +9%
Intl. 74 27 -64% 102 89 -13%
TOTAL 1,331 533 -60% 66 71 +8
The map in Figure 3-17 shows little differences with regards to how the cuts have affected
different regions with cuts across the entire United States.
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Figure 3-17:Change in CVG hub capacity between May 2007 and 2010
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Intra-hub capacity has been cut to all hubs except ATL. CVG's relevance as a hub and O-D
market is declining rapidly and ATL as primary hub offers the largest number of connecting options.
Table 3-32 highlights that SLC remains on top of this category, but has also seen intra-hub capacity
shrink by almost 50%.
Table 3-32: CVG intra-hub capacity
-b007 ASMs per month 2010 ASMs per month h
SLC 70,396,050 36,319,600 -48o
ATL 19,834,275 22,541,882 +14%
LGA 22,797,450 13,910,715 -39%
MSP 15,378,720 11,944,776 2
JFK 10,937,730 9,107,118 -17%
DTW 7,511,200 4,697,935 -37%
MEM 5,227,716 3,812,380 -27%
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While some of the regional partners have grown at CVG, the sweeping capacity cuts have
affected both mainline and regional carriers. With almost 50% of capacity, regional carriers have a very
strong presence at the airport compared to most other hubs in Delta's network. These numbers, presented
in Table 3-33, provide further illustration for the downsizing of the hub. Given the sweeping cuts in
virtually all markets served from CVG, it seems like just a matter of time until the hub is completely
phased out. Similar to MEM, the proximity to another hub (DTW, 220 miles) makes CVG more or less
redundant as a hub and the network changes seen between 2007 and 2010 confirm this. Considering the
weak growth in the surrounding area in recent years, CVG's local market does not appear to warrant a
large offering of nonstop service either. The growth of intra-hub capacity to ATL shows that Delta
intends to route much of this traffic through its primary hubs in the future.
3 1. Significant capacity cutis and hiub consolidation at De ta-North west
Analyzing each hub on its own revealed a number of trends that go beyond the aggregate analysis
of winners and losers in the network. ATL, JFK and LGA have all grown, but in very different ways.
ATL has clearly strengthened its position as primary hub, particularly through its strong growth at the
international level and to the hubs with reduced service. JFK has seen a shift towards larger aircraft and
longer stage-lengths, on both international and domestic routes. Combined with LGA, which grew in
short-haul markets, the airport represents a hub as well as an access point to the New York City market.
SLC, DTW and MSP all experienced capacity cuts, but remain viable hubs within the network.
MEM and CVG, on the other hand, only played a very minor role in 2010 and will likely lose their hub
functions. Delta appears to have re-positioned the smaller hubs with a focus on geographic location and
connections to its international partners in order to relieve ATL and the international gateway at JFK. At
all of these hubs, regional carriers have increased their share of capacity and certain geographic patterns
were identified that highlight the positioning of these airports. CVG and MEM, on the other hand, provide
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good examples of the virtual elimination hubs that have lost their strategic purpose in a larger network
due to their geographic proximity to much larger hubs.
Delta's strategic re-positioning during the merger confirms many of the elements laid out in part
I with regards to revenue synergies. In a combined network, the airline moved services to the hubs that
could serve them best. By moving most of its long-haul international operations to ATL and JFK, the
airline has created strong international gateways that can bundle passenger flows at geographically
convenient locations. This puts Delta in a position to attract more international passengers to these hubs
and subsequently operate larger aircraft at lower unit costs.
On a smaller scale, the remaining hubs serve a similar purpose for international connections.
Long-haul services to Skyteam hubs from these airports make it possible to offer attractive connections
for passengers originating in parts of the country where a routing via ATL would be too circuitous. By
taking advantage of the partners' beyond connections, Delta will likely create enough demand for these
long-haul flights. Domestically, there has been a similar trend to focus capacity to certain regions where
access is most convenient. ATL serves as primary access point to the South and Southeast, DTW and
MSP offer cross-country connections while SLC represents the gateway to the Western United States.
Redundant hubs, like MEM and CVG, will continue to be phased out.
So with a slight overall reduction in network capacity, Delta appears to have created a more
efficient network that can offer passengers access to a large number of possible destinations. The airline
has reduced overlap without damaging its competitive position in these markets. It remains to be seen
whether passengers will accept additional connecting points via ATL or other hubs in the system. But
considering current industry-wide consolidation, the number of nonstop services from non-hub
destinations will likely decrease at many non-hub cities.
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While analysis does not focus on cost synergies, it is reasonable to assume that a more efficient
network will also reduce costs for Delta. In addition to potentially larger aircraft to be operated on long-
haul routes or to and from the major hubs, the increased reliance on regional carriers should also lead to
lower costs across the board. In summary, the Delta-Northwest merger demonstrated many of the effects
on hubs and network design that should be expected as part of a consolidation. It remains to be seen
whether all of the medium hubs will be able to retain their current capacity and service levels in the
coming years.
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3.2 The Demand Side - Change in DL-NW domestic passenger flows in the wake of the merger
In order to test the underlying assumption that network consolidation can be achieved without a
substantial negative impact on traffic, the next step of the analysis will be to track how passenger flows
have changed. Similar to the supply-side view, the approach will involve a snapshot of traffic on all
flights marketed by Delta and Northwest before and after the merger based on the 10% sample of
domestic tickets.2 Since this information is only available for domestic markets and comparable is not
available on an international level, this section will be restricted to domestic passengers. One issue arises
from the timing of the merger. Northwest ticket sample data for the second quarter 2007 is incomplete so
the analysis uses May 2006 as reference point before the merger.
Figure 3-18: DL-NW Daily Domestic Passengers
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2 The data analyzed in this section is sourced from the US DOT 10% Ticket Sample Database that was
accessed through the Diio Mi Market Intelligence portal.
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Between May 2006 and May 2010, Delta-Northwest recorded a substantial decrease in domestic
passengers carried from about 146,500 to 127,000 daily as exhibited in figure 3-18. This represents a drop
of 13%. Naturally, any analysis of this time period needs to account for the impacts of the recession on air
travel. A look at the same months reveals that total US domestic passenger numbers have decreased by
roughly 6%. For the full years 2006 and 2010, the decline amounts to only 4%. (Bureau of Transportation
Statistics) So Delta-Northwest has lost passengers at a higher rate than the domestic average, which
could indicate possible effects of the merger and the subsequent network consolidation process as well as
a shift towards serving more international markets. Other passengers in this case refer to passengers that
did not connect at one of the hubs identified in Section 3.1.
Overall, the combined airline has reduced the number of domestic ASMs by 10% over the same
time period, from 19.3m in May 2006 to 17.4m in May 2010. Domestic capacity reductions in the whole
system totaled 8%, from 99.8m to 91.4m. (BTS) So Delta-Northwest cut capacity by more than the
market as a whole during the recession. But as has been shown in the analysis of the airline's network
consolidation, significant capacity was also shifted in between the hubs. One indicator can be found in the
change of different itinerary types. Figure 3-18 also shows that the airline as carried about 16% fewer
nonstop passengers while the number 1- and 2-stop passengers have only decreased by 9% respectively.
Therefore, the next step of the analysis will focus on where the passenger drops occurred and whether
network consolidation could have had an effect based on certain regional patterns in the changing traffic
flows.
3.2. / Correlation hetween schedule changes and aggregate shifts in pacssengers
To determine where Delta-Northwest has lost most of its passengers and potentially identify any
connection to post-merger network consolidation, it helps to aggregate O-D markets based on which
groups they fall into.
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Table 3-33: Change in Daily Passengers by Market Type
. 1. 0
a .. 51 (8,400) (8,349)
in:16956 (29,982) (13,026)
e e 0 1,809 (42) 1,767
* 18,816 (38,424) (19,608)
As should be expected, the markets where nonstop services were discontinued have experienced a
significant reduction in passengers. This is shown in table 3-33. What is more surprising is that the largest
reduction took place in markets where the type of service did not change, i.e. where nonstop service was
maintained or where it never existed in the first place. Delta-Northwest lost almost 30,000 daily
passengers in O-D markets like this, but, on the other hand, also added 17,000 passengers in the same
category. So there has been a shift and that can be interpreted as a result of capacity adjustments between
the hubs and which allowed the airline to recapture passengers.
These shifts can be illustrated by looking at how 1-stop connections changed at the different hubs
in the system. The three hubs that grew during the hub consolidation process (ATL, JFK and LGA) all
saw an increase in domestic connecting passengers between 2006 and 2010. Table 3-34 shows that ATL
has clearly strengthened its position as core hub, which now accounts for almost half of all domestic
connections. On the other hand, all of the downsized hubs saw their number of connecting passengers
decline. In case of the moderately downsized hubs, this amounted to a reduction of up to 10%. CVG
suffered the most by losing over 2/3 of its connections.
Table 3-34: Change in daily 1-stop connections by connecting hub
* 22,544 194 193 4,351 9,222 5,645 9,599 6,719 58,467
24,918 536 279 3,928 8,735 5,069 7,778 2,028 53,272
2,374 341 86 (423) (486) (577) (1,821) (4,691) (5,195)
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To sum up, the largest drop in domestic passengers did not come from eliminated nonstop
services but took place in markets that either kept their nonstop service or that already had to rely on
connections in 2006. The large fluctuations in this group are partially due to shifts between the hubs, but
could also include potential shifts in capacity between nonstop markets. While this analysis has not
touched upon capacity changes in these markets directly, it has become clear that hub re-alignment
accounts for at least a portion of the changes in domestic passenger flows. In order to obtain a more
detailed picture, the next step will be to analyze the change in Delta-Northwest's passenger flows on a
geographic level to identify potential patterns.
.2.2 Geographic shifts in donstic DelIa-Northwest passenger flows
A look at a geographic distribution of the changes in daily domestic nonstop passenger flows
between 2006 and 2010 in figure 3-19 shows the impact of downsizing many of the existing hubs.
Michigan (-1,115), Tennessee (-622), Ohio (-533), Minnesota (-250) and Utah (-128) all suffered, at least
partially, from reduced nonstop service to the hubs located there. New York, on the other hand, recorded
the strongest growth with 1,680 additional daily passengers. Again, this reflects the strengthening of
service to JFK and LGA respectively.
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Figure 3-19: Change in Daily Nonstop Passengers by Destination (from all domestic origins)
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The non-hub states with even bigger losses were Massachusetts (-2,557) and Florida (-2,249).
Massachusetts represents an interesting case, because Delta used to operate a substantial number of point-
to-point routes to BOS that bypassed its hubs. Examples include MCO (20,000 seats per month) FLL
(12,000), PBI (12,000) and LAX (8,000) along with numerous routes operated by the regional partner
Comair. In 2010, these routes were either abandoned (FLL, LAX) or capacity was cut substantially
(MCO, PBI). Non-hub routes at BOS only accounted for 22% of capacity after the merger compared to
41% in 2006.
Similarly, Delta and Northwest together offered roughly 385,000 seats per month in 2006 out of
Florida on point-to-point routes compared to only 102,000 in 2010. The number of point-to-point routes
to Florida also dropped from 120 to just 13 in 2010. Both cases therefore serve as evidence for a
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substantially consolidated network in which point-to-point service was replaced by connecting services
through the hubs. A good illustration of this shift can be found when mapping the change in I-stop
connecting passengers by destination state, as seen in figure 3-20. For instance, Florida has experienced a
net increase in this category (+378). This is much smaller than the loss of nonstop passengers, but still
substantial considering the intermittent recession and the fact that Florida's gains are the largest
countrywide in this category.
Figure 3-20: Change in Daily 1-stop Passengers by Destination (from all domestic origins)
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The number of 1-stop connecting passengers, as shown in figure 3-20, has clearly increased in
certain parts of the country, primarily on the West Coast, in several of the plain states and select states
along the East Coast. In other states (Utah, Kansas, Missouri and Washington), the number of additional
1-stop passengers exceeded the drop in nonstop passengers and thus amounted to a net increase in
passengers to these states.
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Another way to look at the geographical distribution is to compare them with economic growth
rates during this period of crisis. While there is no clear correlation in all cases, some of the states with
the most substantial decrease in passenger flows also recorded the weakest average annual GDP growth
rates during this time period: Michigan (0%), Florida (0%), Connecticut (0%) and Ohio (1%). On the
other side of the coin, the states with net gains in passengers generally show slightly higher average
growth rates: Utah (4%), Washington (3%), Pennsylvania (3%), Oklahoma (3%), New York (2%) and
Missouri (2%). (Bureau of Economic Analysis) So despite a number of outliers in both directions, there
appears to be at least some correlation between passenger flows and economic growth over the observed
time frame at the state level.
3.2.3 Analvsis ofChange in Top O-DI Markets
Figure 3-21: DL-NW Top 1,000 O-D Markets (prior to merger)
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Another way to analyze the change in passenger flows between 2006 and 2010 is to focus on the
top O-D city pairs only. In the combined Delta-Northwest network, the top 1,000 city pairs in 2006 saw
their daily passenger numbers decrease from roughly 94,000 to 78,.000 over the time period analyzed in
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this study as seen in figure 3-21. It is noteworthy that city pairs involving the eight hubs (incl. intra hub
traffic) accounted for a majority of these passengers with a share of over 80% in 2010. The number of
passengers in hubs markets also declined at a much slower rate than those in nonstop markets.
Figure 3-22: Change of Daily O-D Passengers to/from Hubs
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Figure 3-22 shows daily O-D passengers per individual hub. What might be surprising is that all
eight hubs saw relatively similar total decreases in this category. While, naturally, the decline in
percentage points at MEM is much more severe than at ATL, all hubs lost local O-D passengers between
2006 and 2010. By extension, this also means that capacity cuts at the downsized hubs did not lead to
drastic losses in local traffic. This would support the underlying assumption that the service quality at
these hubs was more or less maintained by replacing previous nonstop capacity with additional services
via the other hubs.
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The reductions at the top non-hub airports were more substantial. In figure 3-23, we can see that
BOS and the Florida airports MCO, FLL and TPA lost substantial portions of their local O-D passengers
to the top markets in Delta's network. DCA saw a significant drop as well. As discussed previously, cuts
in point-to-point capacity at these focus cities play an important role here.
Figure 3-23: Change of Daily O-D Passengers to/from top 15 non-hub airports
10..000
9.,000
L 2006 .2010]
7,000
6,000
5.000
4,000
2,000g
1,00
MCO BOS LAX DCA FLL LAS TPA SEA SFO BDL IND ORD RDU PHL BWI
Non-hub markets, as demonstrated in Fig 3-21 lost nearly 10,000 passengers or 40% of their 2006
levels. Table 3-35 shows the change in passengers in non-hub markets (i.e. BOS-MCO, etc.) that connect
via one of the hubs. We can see that I-stop connections in this group only declined by 1,363 with ATL
and the New York City airports making up for some of the losses at the downsized hubs. In total, Delta
lost over 6,000 passengers in non-hub markets where nonstop service was discontinued, but Table 3-35
shows that only 447 are now being connected via one of the hubs.
Table 3-35: Change in connecting passengers in non-hub markets (from top 1,000 O-D markets)
A[C I. 1 ML 0 kl M,1M Ig A Iy I(atM
.0-. 552 3 11 16 (34) (37) (30) (34) 447
.. (300) 14 96 (195) (300) (107) (21) (943) (1,757)
22 1 3 (10) (39) (13) 5 (22) (53)
Ie 275 18 109 (189) (373) (156) (47) (999) (1,363)
This highlights that one of the most substantial changes in Delta's network between 2006 and
2010 was cutting point-to-point services bypassing the hubs since the airline has been unable to recapture
most of these passengers on its connecting services.
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3.2.4 Traffic decline exceeded capacity cuts
Hub consolidation had a substantial effect on Delta-Northwest's performance in terms of carried
passengers in the domestic market. There are clear shifts between the hubs in favor of ATL, JFK and
LGA and away from the downsized hubs as far as connecting traffic is concerned. However, the evidence
is not completely clear on whether or not the network re-alignment has harmed the airline's passenger
performance. As the integration period coincided with the recession, the first observation is that passenger
numbers have declined substantially across the board. Delta-Northwest has seen a larger decrease than the
country average, but has also cut system capacity more aggressively. Significant geographical differences
in the change of passenger numbers points towards local economic conditions in the different states as at
least one reason behind the passenger reductions in Delta's network.
While the evidence is not entirely conclusive, it is clear that connecting markets have suffered far
less than non-stop markets. The analysis of-Delta's top 1,000 markets has shown the substantial passenger
reduction due to discontinued point-to-point services from non-hub cities. Furthermore, local passengers
to and from the hubs, include those that were downsized, decreased by a much smaller amount than in
non-hub markets. Overall, this aligns with the concept of network consolidation, where markets can be
served via alternative hubs to increase efficiency. Since this analysis did not include information on the
profitability of these services, the exact motivation behind cutting the point-to-point flights might have
also been based on other factors. It remains to be seen whether Delta can recapture these passengers on its
connecting services over time.
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3.3 Summary - Network consolidation accompanied by a significant drop in domestic traffic during the
recession
The underlying premise of this study was that airline mergers allow airlines to consolidate their
networks to exploit operational synergies while retaining their existing customers. In the case of Delta and
Northwest, it has been shown that the combined carrier has strengthened its core hub ATL along with the
New York City airports at the expense of the other hubs in the system. The other hubs have experienced
varying degrees of capacity cuts along with strategic shifts concerning geographical coverage and an
increase presence of regional partners to take over mainline capacity. Over the same time period, the
airline also cut numerous point-to-point services bypassing the hubs, contributing to a double-digit cut in
overall capacity.
The effects on passenger traffic are heavily diluted by the recession, which occurred at the same
time as the merger. Total traffic flows have decreased significantly. Nonetheless, it is clear that
connecting traffic has suffered much less than non-stop services as connections shifted towards ATL and,
to a lesser degree, JFK and LGA. By reducing capacity at focus cities, Delta lost passengers but achieved
a higher concentration in its network. An examination of traffic by geographic region shows that some
states have seen nonstop passengers at least partially replaced by connecting passengers.
Overall, it appears that Delta-Northwest's network integration had already made significant
progress by 2010, which is likely to continue. There is evidence that the airline has managed to maintain
service quality in a lot of its markets despite shifting capacity, but an ultimate verdict on the resulting
traffic performance requires a larger time frame to account for any effects related to the recession.
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4. THE UNITED-CONTINENTAL MERGER
4.1 The Supply Side - Consolidation and re-alignment of UA-CO hubs during the merger
A few months after Delta and Northwest concluded their merger, United and Continental
followed suit on 2 May 2010 and announced their $3 billion merger to create the world's biggest airline at
the time. (NYT DealBook) The integration was concluded in December 2011, when the FAA granted a
single operating certificate to the combined carrier. (Pasztor) As in the previous case study, these dates
will frame the analysis of United-Continental's capacity changes. The comparison will be based on
snapshots from May 2010 and May 2012 and consider all flights marketed by either of the two carriers
including regional carriers.
Total network capacity, as shown in figure 4-1, did not change to a significant degree in the case
of United-Continental. Domestic and international capacities also represent roughly the same proportions
in 2010 and 2012. This marks a difference from Delta-Northwest and their reduction of domestic
capacity. The analysis will therefore look at whether this is due to geographic shifts or the fact that the
worst recession effects were over by the time United and Continental merged so that cuts did not have to
be as steep as in the previous case.
Figure 4-1: Total Network ASMs in May (marketed by UA & CO)
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62
........................................   . .  .  . . .  . ......................... .  
Similar to the Delta-Northwest case, the United-Continental merger combined two legacy carriers
operating hub-and-spoke networks with multiple hubs. There are a total of 8 domestic hubs in the merged
network that will be analyzed: New York-Newark (EWR), Houston-Intercontinental (IAH), Chicago-
O'Hare (ORD), San Francisco (SFO), Washington-Dulles (IAD)., Denver (DEN), Los Angeles (LAX) and
Cleveland (CLE). United-Continental also operates two hubs outside the continental United States in
Guam (GUM) and Tokyo-Narita (NRT). These hubs will appear in the aggregate network analysis but
will not be analyzed in detail, as their strategic role is so different from the hubs located in the 50 states.
The approach to analyzing the United-Continental merger will be identical to the Delta-Northwest case
and focus on hub operations to quantify how capacity has shifted between the hubs and identify patterns
that can lead to conclusions about the carrier's strategy. First, an aggregate analysis will highlight the
relative size of each hub with regards to capacity, flights, destinations and the role of regional carriers.
Then an analysis of each hub by itself will examine any changes in greater detail.
As opposed to Delta-Northwest, the hubs in the combined United-Continental network can be best
grouped by their size after the merger. There are some variations in terms of capacity and frequency
changes, but the importance for the system can be best captured by these categories:
Primary hubs
- EWR - Gateway to New York City and the world
- LAH - Selective growth during the merger, but facing Southwest
" ORD - Slightly smaller, but still a major hub for the combined carrier
* SFO - Growing West Coast gateway
- IAD - Secondary East Coast gateway with regional carrier growth
Medium-sized hubs
- LAX - Access to strong local market and smaller international gateway
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o DEN - Downsizing in both domestic and international markets
Small hubs with limited relevance for the network
e CLE - Minor regional hub with large regional carrier presence
4. 1. Aggregate analy~sis of capacity. flights. destinaions and operating carriers by huh
The aggregate overview in Figure 4-2 reveals a key difference between the networks of Delta-
Northwest and United-Continental. While Delta operates a centralized hub in ATL that accounts for
roughly 50% of total hub capacity, United-Continental distributes this role between a number of hubs in
different parts of the country. Based on capacity, EWR, IAH, ORD, SFO and IAD represent the primary
hubs in the network, but DEN and LAX also offer more than lb ASMs. Only CLE is significantly smaller
and comparable to Delta's hub in MEM in terms of available capacity. Figure 4-2 also shows that most of
the hubs maintained their available capacity or even increased it between 2010 and 2012. The only hubs
to see reductions in this category were ORD, DEN and CLE. SFO saw the largest increase with over
300m ASMs added (+15%).
Figure 4-2: Total ASMs by Hub
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Another key difference to Delta's network can also be found in the distribution of international
capacity between United-Continental's hubs. Figure 4-3 shows that EWR is the clear leader in this
category, but IAD, IAH, SFO and ORD all represent strong international gateways as well. In addition,
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only ORD and DEN have seen their international capacity decline during the merger while the others
have grown in this category. So it becomes clear that as opposed to Delta, United-Continental's strategy
shows less emphasis on centralization. The detailed analysis later in this section will examine the
geographic orientation of these hubs to identify any shifts during this period.
Figure 4-3: International ASMs by Hub
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Comparing the hubs based on the number of flights, as demonstrated in figure 4-4, reveals that
the biggest hubs by ASM capacity do not have the largest number of flights. EWR, for instance, only
ranks third in this category behind IAH and ORD. This points towards different emphases in terms of
aircraft size similar to what has been observed at Delta. It is also noteworthy that all hubs offered fewer
flights in 2012 than they did in 2010 with the exception of SFO. Considering the increases in capacity, it
is likely that flights to destinations served by both carriers have been consolidated to achieve cost
synergies. A closer look at aircraft sizes will be conducted later in this section to confirm this.
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Figure 4-4: Total Flights by Hub
i 4-J
2L1
U)
IAHi GU) E~~f * ~ h P.. J_' N LAY' LL (Ai \WJ O
An overview of the number of non-hub destinations served from each hub in Figure 4-5 offers a
very different picture from what happened at Delta. Most of the hubs served more destinations in 2012
than they in 2010. ORD, EWR and CLE are the only exceptions, but the decreases were not substantial in
any case.
Figure 4-5: Number of non-hub Destinations by Hub
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Figure 4-6 shows how the share of regional carriers operating on behalf of United-Continental has
changed. Compared to Delta-Northwest, regional carriers already accounted for 60% or more of flights at
all of United-Continental's domestic hubs before the merger. The overall trend is very similar to what
happened at Delta, as almost all airports had a higher proportion of flights operated by regional partners in
2012 compared to 2010. The only exception is LAX. The fact that CLE, the smallest domestic hub by
capacity, is served almost exclusively by regional partners shows that the airport only plays a very minor
role as a hub.
As has been mentioned in part 3, the increased reliance on regional partners is largely due to their
generally more favorable cost structure. It is evident that United-Continental also aimed to reduce
operating costs by shifting capacity to its partners.
Figure 4-6: Share of Flights operated by Regional Partners
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Overall, United-Continental has pursued a somewhat different strategy compared to Delta-
Northwest. In its multi-hub network, a significant proportion of hubs did not experience any downsizing
but rather grew in some categories. These include EWR, IAH, SFO, IAD and LAX. ORD experienced
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some reductions in capacity, destinations and flights, but nonetheless remains one of the airline's primary
hubs. The only airports to see more significant downsizing were DEN and CLE to a degree where the
hub function has come into questions. CLE already started from a very low base and thus plays a very
minor role. The fate of DEN remains to be seen, but the airport shares many characteristics with Delta's
SLC hub, which is also losing significance. The following pages contain a more detailed analysis of each
hub in order to identify any strategic shifts that go beyond aggregate capacity or flights.
4.1.2A: LWR- Gateway to New York City and the world
EWR has not experienced substantial changes over the course of the merger. Table 4-1 shows that
international capacity increased slightly accompanied by a minor decline in domestic capacity. But these
changes are negligible relative to the overall capacity available at EWR.
Table 4-1: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at EWR
Domestic 18,279 18,399 +1% 1,207,105 1,190,965 -1%
International 2,736 2,713 -1% 2,886,648 2,939,955 +2%/4)
TOTAL 21,015 21,112 0% 4,093,753 4,130,919 +1%
Along the same lines, aircraft sizes remained fairly constant as well. International capacity
growth, seen in table 4-2, came from a slight increase in aircraft sizes on these routes. International
markets account for roughly 20% of seats at EWR.
Table 4-2: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at EWR
Domestic 1,740 1,740 0%0/ 95 95 W0%
Intl. 412 415 + I1%4 150 153 +2%
TOTAL 2,-152 2, 155 0%11 123 124 +1%1/
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Figure 4-7: Change in EWR hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Domestic capacity changes, as demonstrated in figure 4-7, were minor in virtually all parts of the
country. Washington saw a significant increase in this category. Intra-hub markets from EWR, however,
experienced growth to all but two of the other hubs. Table 4-3 shows double-digit growth to the West
Coast hubs and ORD. Only IAH and IAD had less capacity in 2012 than before the merger.
Table 4-3: EWR intra-hub capacity
-b2010 ASs per -onth 2012 ASMs per montha
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The strong local market certainly plays a role here. Growing intra-hub capacity also shows that
EWR has strengthened its position as a primary international gateway for the combined carrier. Figure 4-8
shows growing capacity to Asia and especially Latin America. There were minor cuts to Europe, the
Middle East and the Caribbean.
Figure 4-8: Change in EWR hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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In terms of the carriers operating this capacity, mainline United now offers more capacity from
EWR than Continental did in 2010. This can be seen in table 4-4. The regional partners have also
increased their capacity, but their total share has decreased slightly.
Table 4-4: EWR Hub capacity by Operating Carrier
UA/CO mainline 3,782,508 3,808,480 + 1%
Regional partners 311,245 322,437 +4%
United - 3,808,480 +3 ]0848
Shuttle America - 43,856 +4_,X_6
Expressjet 248,450 226,308 +226_308
Colgan Air 57,547 37,992 -19.555
CommutAir 5,248 14,281 +
Continental 3,782,508 - -3,782,508
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It seems clear that EWR continues to play an important role in the strategy of the combined
carrier. Given its geographic location, the airport has a similar gateway function as JFK for Delta. Added
capacity from the other hubs shows that within the combined network, United aims to strengthen this
position. The buildup of JFK and LGA mentioned in part 3 also makes EWR even more important for
United in order to protect its access to the attractive New York City local market.
4 1. 2B: IJAI Selective growth during ihe iner r. bit aing lSouthwiest
Similar to EWR, IAH represented one of the cornerstones of Continental's network prior to the
merger in addition to the airline's headquarters. Table 4-5 shows, however, that capacity has been reduced
more at IAH. Nonetheless, the cuts do not amount to a strategic re-alignment of the hub, which serves as a
key distributor for domestic traffic as well as international gateway with a focus on Central America.
Table 4-5: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at IAH
Domestic 30,727 29,033 -6% 2,614,029 2,551,674 -2%
International 3,026 3,283 +8% 700,859 687,348 -2%
TOTAL 33,753 32,316 -4% 3,314,888 3,239,022 -2%
Table 4-6 shows a decrease of overall seat capacity driven by domestic markets. Average aircraft
sizes have remained relatively low on both the international and domestic level. The focus on shorter haul
international markets like Mexico explains the average seating capacity of only 112 on international
flights.
Table 4-6: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at IAH
Domestic 2,627 2,506 -5%o 86 86 1o'
Intl. 340 367 +8'% 112 112 (0%,
TOTAL 2,968 2,873 -3% 99 99 0
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Domestic capacity changes, as exhibited in figure 4-9, show that the capacity cuts were
distributed fairly evenly across the United States. There is some consistency in cutting capacity to all
West Coast states and the Southeast, but no states has experienced cuts by an amount that would
undermine IAH's role as a primary hub in United's network.
Figure 4-9:Change in IAH hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Similar to EWR, Table 4-7 shows double-digit growth from most of the other hubs. IAH also
represents an attractive local market, but the airport also serves as international gateway to a number of
global regions.
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Table 4-7: IAH intra-hub capacity
-ub 2010 ASMs per month 2012 AS-s per month Change
172,099,200
146,394,640
114,446,730
84,434,925
73,880,688
62,176,090
27,510,420
155,796,200
153,475,805
148,364,805
101,086,775
92,791,692
50,952,973
47,398,890
Figure 4-10 shows that international capacity grew to Latin America, Canada and Africa. Given
its geographic location, IAH represents an ideal gateway to Latin America for most parts of the United
States.
Figure 4-10: Change in IAH hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
+ 43%
-12%
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+46
+2%
As exhibited in table 4-8, the decrease in domestic capacity has been accompanied by a slight
shift towards more regional partner activity. They have increased their overall share of capacity and
additional carriers have started operating from IAH.
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LAX
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CLE
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Table 4-8: Hub caDacitv bV oDerating carrier
Regional partners 586,049 624,098 +6%
United - 2,614,925 2,.6142
Expressjet 550,349 404,486 -145,863
SkyWest - 158,418 +_58,4_8
Colgan Air 13,884 39,716 +25,832
CommutAir - 11,535 +135
Shuttle America - 9,943 +9.43
Chautauqua 21,816 - -21.816
Continental 2,648,261 - -2,648,261
The position of IAH within the combined airline's network remained strong during the merger.
Despite the loss of Continental's headquarters, the airports maintained its importance for domestic
connections and as an international gateway. Nevertheless, the airport has experienced some domestic
capacity cuts that could be attributed to the elimination of duplications in the combined network. In 2012,
United announced a 10% capacity cut at IAH in response to the city's decision to let Southwest operate
international flights from Houston Hobby. (Koenig & Freed) Whether this will undermine IAH's hub
function in the long run and where this capacity will be moved remains to be seen.
4.1.2C: ORD Slightly smaller, but still a malor hub for the comb ined carrier
After the merger, Chicago has become the headquarters of the combined airline and the hub at
ORD has remained one of the largest in United's network. As opposed to EWR and IAH, however, the
airport experienced noteworthy capacity cuts between 2010 and 2012. Table 4-9 shows a cut of roughly
10% in domestic ASMs and flights.
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Table 4-9: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at ORD
Domestic 30,826 28,327 -81% 2,388,121 2,148,903 -10%
International 1,561 1,586 624,776 607,886 -3%
TOTAL 32,387 29,913 -8% 3,012,897 2,756,789 -9%
Average aircraft capacity, as seen in table 4-10, also decreased over the same time period in both
international and domestic markets. As a result, the total number of seats available in these markets
declined as well.
Table 4-10: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at ORD
OR #Sat (00s Av.SasprArrf
Domestic
Intl.
TOTAL
2,593
194
2,787
2,290
190
2,480
-12%
-2'V
-11%
-4%
124
104
120
100
-3%
-4%
The geographic distribution of capacity changes in figure 4-11 shows a fairly even distribution of
capacity cuts across the United States. It should be noted that some of the coastal states (California,
Florida and Massachusetts) saw slight capacity increases that highlight ORD's importance to connect
cross-country traffic.
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Figure 4-11:Change in ORD hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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As opposed to EWR and IAH, intra-hub capacity from ORD also declined in some cases.
Through the integration process, IAH has recovered the capacity lost by DEN while EWR has gained as
well. But overall, ORD maintains strong links with the other hubs in United's network.
Table 4-11: ORD intra-hub capacity
- 2 A -
234,822,276
190,416,145
84,434,925
105,424,248
66,559,987
42,089,940
14,956,912
252,519,878
183,327,955
101,086,775
83,567,016
76,485,782
37,661,838
13,912,848
+7.54%
-3.72%
1) 72%
-20.73%) /
-1 0.52%
-6. 98/
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In addition to benefitting from the attractive Chicago local market, ORD remains an international
gateway with increased capacity to the Americas and Asia. But figure 4-12 also shows capacity
reductions to Europe that were more significant than those observed at EWR and IAH. These took place
on flights to Italy (-27m ASMs) and the Netherlands (-12m ASMs). But at the same time, United has
further increased its capacity to Germany to 125m ASMs, which points towards an increased reliance on
its Star Alliance partner Lufthansa to distribute its European traffic.
Fig. 4-12: Change in ORD hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
+5%
-12% +2%
+50%
+20%
Table 4-12 demonstrates that the capacity cuts affected both the mainline carrier and its regional
partners. But the proportion of capacity offered has shifted slightly towards regional partners who
experienced smaller cuts.
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Table 4-12: ORD Hub CaDacitv by Ooerati
Regional partners 667,968 617,008 -8%
United 2,344,930 2,139,782 -205,148
Expressjet 112,869 225,572 +112,703
SkyWest 207,861 123,700 -84,161
Shuttle America 139,041 99,974 -39,067
GoJet 100,774 82,415 -18,359
Mesa 62,778 67,575 +4 797
Trans States 44,645 17,772 -26,873
To sum up, ORD was the first of the United hubs analyzed where domestic capacity was cut to a
degree that is noteworthy. The hub still offers more flights and destinations than most other hubs in the
network, but aircraft sizes have declined and regional carriers operate a slightly larger share of total
capacity after the merger. Given the importance of Chicago as the company's headquarters and
international growth to a number of regions, the cuts can be interpreted as fine-tuning of existing capacity
that was not directly affected by the merger.
4 1.2D- SIFO -Growing West Coast Gaieway
As pointed out in the aggregate analysis of United's network, SFO recorded the largest capacity
of all of the hubs. Table 4-13 shows that these increases took place in both domestic and international
markets. Due to its geographic position, SFO's international capacity generally represents a higher share
of the total than at other hubs. But domestic capacity actually increased substantially more over the course
of the merger.
Table 4-13: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at SFO
Domestic 11,522 13,029 +13% 1,546,722 1,790,592 +16%
International 746 889 +19% 628,581 701,886 +12%
TOTAL 12,268 13,918 +13% 2,175,303 2,756,789 +27%
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In Table 4-14, we can see that average aircraft sizes actually decreased slightly across the board
and that capacity growth therefore came from the increased frequencies. Despite of this, SFO still shows
larger average aircraft sizes than most of the other hubs, especially in international markets due to the
large number of long-haul services.
Table 4-14: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at SFO
Domestic 1,)000 1, '106 +-1% 87 85 -2%
Intl. 138 163 +1%185 183 -%
TOTAL 1,138 1,1269 +1%136 134 -1%
Domestic capacity growth, as shown in figure 4-13, was particularly strong to the Northeast,
Florida and Texas. This demonstrates the importance of nonstop operations from the large populations
centers to SFO and further on to Asia without the need to connect at one of the other hubs in the middle
of the country. Capacity cuts only occurred in a small number of states and were minor.
Figure 4-13: Change in SFO hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Similar to EWR and IAH, table 4-15 shows that intra-hub capacity increased across the board.
Only capacity to DEN is lower than before the merger. In most of the cases, there was double-digit
growth to SFO, which underlines the importance of this hub in the combined United-Continental network.
Table 4-15: SFO intra-hub capacity
Elub 2010ASMs per month 202ASMs per month Cang
ORD 234,822,276 252,519,878 +7.54%
IAD 198,246,726 246,191,306 +25 18%
EWR 199,723,725 237,003,435 + 67%
IAH 114,446,730 148,364,805 29 4%
DEN 94,792,109 78,632,572 -17.05%
LAX 44,245,404 45,374,691
CLE 28,125,415 42,923,943 57 62
As indicated before, SFO represents an important international gateway due to its geographic
position and its local market. Figure 4-14 confirms that capacity increased to almost all of the regions
served from SFO. Given the short distance, the increase of ASMS to Central America is particularly
substantial but Asia also represents an important market for SFO.
Figure 4-14: Change in SFO hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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The international gateway and focus on larger population centers also translates into a smaller
role for regional partners. SkyWest is the only carrier operating on behalf of United other than the
mainline at this hub and while its capacity increased, mainline increased its share even more.
Table 4-15: SFO Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
UA/CO mainline 2,017,412 2,279,426 + 13%
Regional partners 157,891 212,479
United 2,017,412 2,279,426 4
Sky West 157,891 212,470
SFO has clearly become a more important hub in the combined network after the merger.
Capacity and frequency increases across the board for both domestic and international markets confirm
this. Growing capacity to population centers in the East and South also shows that United is emphasizing
nonstop service to accommodate strong local demand and connections to international markets beyond
SFO.
4-1.2E: IAD - Secondary East Coasi Gaewavy regional carrier growth
Prior to the merger, IAD served as United's primary international gateway on the East Coast.
Considering that the combined carrier now also has the EWR hub in its network, it is somewhat
surprising to see overall capacity stay virtually constant at [AD. International capacity, as shown in table
4-16, even increased slightly along with international frequencies. In turn, domestic frequencies saw some
minor cuts.
Table 4-16: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at IAD
Domestic 14,519 13,414 -8% 1,451,721 1,441,717 -1%
International 1,036 1,110 +7% 700,859 734,304 +5%
TOTAL 15,555 14,524 -7% 2,152,579 2,176,021 +1%
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Table 4-17 shows that only minor adjustments were made to the average aircraft size. Similar to
SF0, relatively large aircraft are used on international flights as most of them represent long-haul
services.
Table 4-17: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at IAD
Domestic L,134 1,058 -7% 78 79 +1%
Intl. 177 186 +51% 171 168 -2%
TOTAL 1,311 1,244 -5% 125 123 -2%
In Figure 4-15, we can see that domestic capacity was primarily cut in shorter haul markets on the
East Coast in favor of longer haul markets in the West and Southwest. This aligns with the observations
from SFO that United is promoting longer haul nonstop services to the hubs that offer better connections
to the international gateways at the coast. In addition, IAD also serves an attractive local market where
United will likely aim to preserve its market share.
Figure 4-15: Change in IAD hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Except for SFO and IAH, intra-hub capacity from IAD also decreased to all other hubs. The
airport also does not have direct service to the LAX hub. Table 4-19 also shows that capacity between
IAH and IAD has increased significantly over the course of the merger, which points towards increasing
connections offered from IAD via IAH and vice versa.
Table 4-19: IAD intra-hub capacity
-I 3. I I -Hub 2010 ASMs per month 2-012 ASMs Per- month Cag
SFO 198,246,726 246,191,306
DEN 119,262,924 106,103,448 - i 03%
IAH 27,510,420 47,398,890
ORD 42,089,940 37,661,838 -10 52%
EWR 5,592,102 4,512,192 -19 31%
CLE 4,939,776 3,999,744 -19 03%,
International capacity changes, as exhibited in figure 4-20, show a mixed picture for IAD. There
have been substantial increases to Europe and Africa, which make sense given the geographic location
where IAD can funnel traffic from the United States towards these regions. This also shows that IAD has
in fact been strengthened as a European gateway where EWR lost some capacity. So United appears to
follow a slightly different strategy from Delta and not emphasize its New York City hub as exclusive East
Coast gateway. International capacity to other regions, particularly Latin America, was reduced. With the
background of network integration, this seems intuitive as these markets can be served via some of the
other hubs. The substantial growth in capacity to IAH can also be interpreted in this context as it offers
United a way to combine some of its southbound international traffic at IAH.
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Figure 4-20: Change in IAD hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Table 4-15 shows a small increase of regional carrier capacity relative to the mainline at IAD.
What is more noteworthy at IAD is the increase of frequencies offered by regional partners, which went
up from about 9,500 to 10,900 and therefore accounted for 75% of IAD frequencies in 2012. As figure 4-
6 showed, this was the largest increase of all hubs and now makes IAD the hub with the second largest
ratio of frequencies operated by regional partners.
Table 4-20: IAD Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
UA/CO mainline 1,927,268 1,885,944 -2%
Regional partners 225,311 274,632 +22 %
United 1,927,268 1,885,944 -41-324
Expressjet 16,690 83,690 +67.000
Mesa 44,440 48,191 +_375 1
Colgan Air 10,140 32,685 22. 545
GoJet 49,149 18,963 -30 186
Shuttle America 49,822 15,964 -33.858
Trans States 34,687 15,739 -18.948
Other 20,383 59,400 _____)__()17
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Overall, it appears that United has strengthened the IAD hub as a transatlantic gateway despite
the relative proximity to EWR. Domestically, growth in cross-country markets can be interpreted as an
effort to facilitate these international connections. The substantial increase in frequencies operated by
regional partners appears to contradict the notion of a strengthened hub to some degree. In the case of the
Delta-Northwest merger, these shifts generally coincided with the downsizing of hubs in order to take
advantage of the partners' more favorable cost structure. So far, this does not seem to be the case at IAD
and United has in general been more inclined to use regional carriers than Delta.
4.1.3A: L AX Access to strong local market and smaller internationlIgatewav
LAX plays an interesting role in United's network as it represents the second major gateway on
the West Coast in addition to SFO. United is therefore the only large US carrier operating two hubs on the
West Coast. As shown in the aggregate section of this report, LAX is much smaller than SFO in terms of
capacity, flights and destinations. Table 4-25 and 4-26 show that domestic flying has decreased both in
terms of capacity and available frequency. At the same time, however, international capacity has grown
by over 50% and the number of international frequencies has increased by about 44%.
Table 4-25: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at LAX
101 201 ChanI00 02 Cag
Domestic 9,006 8,044 -11% 1,002,915 988,658 -1%
International 200 288 +44' 141,703 222,572 +5T%
TOTAL 9,206 8,322 -10% 1,144,618 1,211,230
Table 4-26 also shows a substantial increase in aircraft capacity in international markets, which
point towards an increased use of large wide bodies serving long haul routes. On the other hand, domestic
aircraft sizes further decreased to the relatively low level of 72 seats on average.
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Table 4-26: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at LAX
Domestic 668 583 -13% 74 72 -3%
Intd. 31 53 + 71%0/ 157 185 +18%
TOTAL 699 636 -9% 116 129 +11t%
In figure 4-23, we can see that capacity reductions primarily affected short-haul flights to LAX,
Hawaii and cross-country services from the Northeast and Florida. United did not have service from this
hub to most other parts in the country before the merger so its domestic function primarily focuses on
serving the states in its immediate vicinity and large population centers on the East Coast. In this sense,
the underlying domestic strategy is similar to that of SFO, but focused on a much smaller set of
destination states.
Figure 4-23: Change in LAX hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Intra-hub traffic has increased to all hubs with the exception of ORD and DEN. This is shown in
table 4-27. In combination with the capacity cuts in figure 4-23, this points towards a decrease in cross-
country traffic as ORD and DEN would naturally serve as connecting points for these markets.
Table 4-27: LAX intra-hub capacity
I I I5 iHub 2010 ASMs per month 2012 ASMs per month Cag
EWR 166,211,874 199,647,624 + 2
ORD 190,416,145 183,327,955 -3.72%
IAH 146,394,640 153,475,805 +4 84%
DEN 75,875,826 63,981,088 -15.68%
CLE 49,602,533 52,815,478 +6 48%
SFO 44,245,404 45,374,691
Figure 4-24 maps the changes in international capacity where growth has taken place to Central
America and Asia. As stated earlier, the geographic position makes LAX a suitable gateway for these
markets. It should be noted that SFO increased capacity to both of these regions as well so the dual hub
strategy on the West Coast continued throughout the merger. In addition, both LAX and SFO are
important local markets for these destinations with a particular emphasis on ethic traffic.
Figure 4-24: Change in LAX hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Considering the shift towards more international capacity, it is not surprising that the mainline
has increased its capacity share at LAX. This is shown in table 4-28. Continental shows up as a hub
carrier in this point because of the direct services it used to operate to several destinations in Hawaii.
Table 4-28: LAX Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
UA/CO mainline 995,715 1,086,676 +9%
Regional partners 148,903 124,554 -16%
United 928,588 1,086,676 158.088
ExpressJet - 431 +43
SkyWest 148,903 124,123 -24,780
Continental 67,127 - -67,127
The analysis has shown that the role of LAX in United's network is fairly similar to that of the
larger SFO hub. Its local market and geographic position provide a foundation for a viable international
gateway and increasing capacity through additional frequencies and larger aircraft on international routes
show that United aims to bolster this position. The relative geographic proximity to SFO does not
undermine LAX and the airport will likely remain an important component alongside United's primary
international gateways.
4. 1.3B: DEN - Downsizing in both domestic and international markets
DEN represents a smaller hub within the combined network of United compared to the larger
international gateways discussed up to this point. Table 4-21 also shows a much smaller share of
international capacity and flights than at the other airports. Considering the airport's position in the center
of the United States and the smaller local market, it makes sense that it does not function as a major
international gateway. Over the course of the merger, DEN has also experienced significant capacity cuts
in both domestic and international markets. Domestic flights and capacity were cut by more than 10% and
international capacity reduced by more than half.
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Table 4-21: Change in Number of f
Domestic 20,629 18,372 -11'% 1,468,732 1,240,579 -16%
International 785 651 -17% 97,603 49,848 -49%
TOTAL 21,414 19,023 -11% 1,566,335 1,290,427 -18%
Cuts were also made to total available seats and average aircraft capacity, as shown in table 4-22.
Compared to the other hubs, United on average operates very small at DEN with a capacity of only 77
seats.
Table 4-22: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at DEN
DE #Sat (000s Av.Sat0 eArrf
Domestic 1,743 1,488 -15% 84 81 -4%
Intl. 62 47 -24% 80 73 -9%
TOTAL 1,805 1,535 -15% 82 77 -6%
Figure 4-21 shows capacity cuts to virtually all parts of the country except for a few states.
Capacity has been cut particularly to the West Coast states, which indicates that DEN's importance to
connect cross-country traffic is decreasing. Considering the increases in cross-country capacity at the
coastal airports mentioned above, it appears that United has been replacing connections with new nonstop
services in these markets. DEN appears to be a victim of this strategy.
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its and total ASMs at DEN
Figure 4-21:Change in DEN hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Intra-hub capacity, as shown in table 4-23, has also been cut to all of the old United hubs.
Capacity was increased to EWR, IAH and CLE, which can be linked to the integration of networks and
the growing reliance of DEN to connect to the international gateways to make up for lost international
capacity.
Table 4-23: DEN intra-hub capacity
-ASMs per month 2012 ASMs per month C
119,262,924
73,880,688
81,891,915
105,424,248
94,792,109
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19,124,724
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83,567,016
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24,028,407
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Figure 4-22 shows that DEN has lost all of its nonstop services to Europe. EWR, along with IAD
and ORD, represent natural choices to recapture this traffic on their connecting services.
Figure 4-22: Change in DEN hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Capacity cuts have affected both mainline and regional carriers, but regional carriers have
increased their capacity share to now make up more than half of the available capacity at DEN. This
further supports the interpretation that DEN is being downsized and losing importance as a hub in
United's network.
Table 4-24: Hub canacitv by oneratine carrier
UA/CO mainline 1,027,875 834,209 -19%
Regional partners 538,461 456,217 -15%
United 1,027,875 834,209 -193,666
SkyWest 420,807 240,787 -180,020
ExpressJet - 96,105 t96.105
Shuttle America 83,774 64,489 -19,285
GoJet 23,842 54,836 +30,994
Trans States 10,038 - -10.038
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So all signs point towards a reduction of hub activity at DEN. Capacity cuts, smaller aircraft sizes
and a bigger role for regional partners align with many of the changes observed at the hubs downsized
during the Delta-Northwest merger. Considering DEN's geographic position, cross-country traffic can
also be routed via ORD and IAH or nonstop, as the changes at some of the other hubs have shown. The
airport remains a viable hub, but especially the cuts in international capacity indicate a much smaller role
for DEN in the future.
4.1 4A: CLi Minor regional hub with large regional carrier presence
The former Continental hub at CLE is the smallest hub in the combined carrier's network by
capacity and number of frequencies. Table 4-29 shows a further decrease in both of these categories.
Despite a small increase in international capacity, international service at CLE remains negligible and
does not include any long-haul routes.
Table 4:29: Change in Number of Flights and total ASMs at CLE
Domestic 8,211 7,956 -3% 310,863 278,670 -10%
International 197 195 -1% 5,335 6,908 +29%
TOTAL 8,408 8,151 -3% 316,198 285,578 -10%
In table 4-30, we can see that United operates extremely small aircraft at CLE, which is due to the
very large share of regional partners operating there. The level slightly above 50 seats indicates that
virtually no narrow bodies are used.
Table 4:30: Change in Number of Seats and avg. Seats per Aircraft at CLE
Domestic 478 444 -7% 58 56 -3%
Intl. 10 11 +10'% 53 56 +6%/
TOTAL 488 455 -7' 55 56 +2%
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Capacity cuts have taken place primarily along the East Coast as shown in figure 4-25. Given the
limited overall capacity, CLE only had significant service to a relatively small number of states. The most
significant states by number of flights are New York, Pennsylvania, Indiana, Michigan and Wisconsin so
the airport primarily serves destinations in its immediate vicinity and small capacity growth has
predominantly affected short haul services as well.
Figure 4-25: Change in CLE hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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Table 4-31 shows that intra-hub capacity has increased overall and, most significantly to the West
Coast hubs, DEN and EWR. With the background of network integration, it makes sense to reduce
capacity to IAH and instead distribute it to some of the former United hubs that can offer similar
connections.
93
r
... ..............
+ 4 ;.' ,
4-31: CLE intra-hub capacity
Rub 2010 ASMs per month ',2012 ASMs per month Cag
LAX 49,602,533 52,815,478
IAH 62,176,090 50,952,973 18.05
SFO 28,125,415 42,923,943 5
DEN 19,124,724 24,028,407
EWR 19,208,584 19,854,580
ORD 14,956,912 13,912,848 -6.98%
IAD 4,939,776 3,999,744 -19.03%
International capacity, as stated before, is a very small component at CLE. Figure 4-26 displays
that there has been a minor increase to Central America but the airport only offers limited service to
leisure destinations. Capacity to the Caribbean was eliminated entirely.
Figure 4-26: Change in CLE hub capacity between May 2010 and 2012
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We have seen that regional carriers account for the vast majority of flight operations at CLE. But,
as Table 4-32 shows, the mainline still accounts for the majority of capacity offered. Regional offer the
short-haul regional services that play the biggest role at CLE while mainline United serves some of the
longer haul markets to international destinations and the other hubs.
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Table 4-32: CLE Hub Capacity by Operating Carrier
UA/CO mainline 186,078 162,284 -13%
Regional partners 130,121 120,226 -8%
United - 162,284 1 .4
Expressjet 82,965 75,940 -7,025
Chautauqua 34,534 21,730 -12,804
CommutAir 11,106 15,549 4.443
Trans States - 5,363
Silver Airways 1,516 1,644 2
Continental 186,078 - -186.078
The low starting point before the merger and the continued capacity cuts indicate that CLE does
not play a significant role in combined United-Continental network. Since the distance to ORD is very
low with only 315m, CLE is in an equally difficult position as MEM and CVG in the Delta-Northwest
network. With a 90% share of flights for regional carriers, the hub in its current form only appears viable
by taking advantage of their cost structures. As network integration proceeds, the CLE hub would become
even more vulnerable.
4.1.5 Capacishfts with stable network capacity' overall
The analysis of the network and hubs operated by the combined United-Continental has revealed
a very different evolution from that of Delta-Northwest in the previous section. Most notably, the network
does not have one centralized hub that accounts for a disproportionally large share of capacity like Delta
does in ATL. Instead, there are five primary hubs that differ slightly with regards to their geographic
orientation but all account for a significant share of overall network capacity: EWR, IAH, ORD, SFO and
IAD.
Though EWR stands out in terms of international capacity, all five of these hubs represent large
international gateways serving a number of different global regions. Given their geographic positioning,
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their international services generally focus on the regions most accessible to them. EWR, IAD and ORD
represent the primary gateways to Europe while IAH and SFO provide access to Latin America and Asia
respectively. Nonetheless, the hubs are not exclusively focused on serving these international markets and
generally offer service to other global regions as well. These are frequently directed at linking with the
Star Alliance partners, for instance in the case of SFO's service to Germany or ORD's service to Brazil.
United also benefits from the fact that these cities also have significant local markets that support
international service more than, for example, MSP, DTW or even ATL in the case of Delta.
It appears that the merger has not affected the position of these five hubs as international
gateways and primary hubs in the network. However, most of them have experienced small cuts in
domestic capacity between 2010 and 2012. But at the same time, there have been capacity increases to
certain parts of the country that indicate in which direction United might be moving in terms of strategy.
The coastal hubs have generally increased capacity to the opposite coast and intra-hub capacity has also
grown in most cases. One interpretation of these shifts concerning network integration could be that
United is strengthening its coastal hubs by offering more nonstop capacity in longer haul markets and that
traffic in shorter haul markets is being routed via hubs like IAH or ORD. It should be noted that the
respective changes in capacity are relatively small and that these changes need to be observed over a
longer time frame to reach a more robust conclusion. But growing intra-hub capacity in particular
provides an indicator of advancing network integration and, ultimately, consolidation.
Beyond the five major hubs, the combined carrier operates three smaller hubs in the United States
that play a somewhat different role in the network. LAX appears to offer international access to a strong
local market and some reliever functions for SFO. DEN has experienced the most significant capacity
cuts among the airports analyzed in this section. International capacity in particular has been reduced to a
point where the airport should be characterized as a domestic hub with only minor international service.
But domestic capacity has been cut as well and, given growing nonstop services from coast to coast,
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could see further reductions in the future. Lastly, CLE has always been a small hub and plays a very
minor role in the system with a large presence of regional partners. While LAX seems to have a lasting
place in United's strategy, DEN and CLE look like the first victims of the merger. Similar to the Delta
case, CLE faces the issue of geographic proximity to another hub. This is not an issue for DEN, but as
opposed to Delta, United operates two hubs on the West Coast that could make a Rocky Mountain hub
redundant.
Comparing the United-Continental merger with Delta-Northwest has revealed a number of
interesting differences in terms of network structure and adjustments during the integration process. Other
than some relatively minor adjustments, United has maintained significant portions of its pre-merger
network. History provides some perspective on these rather modest capacity cuts. Between 2001 and
2010, a time during which United also went through bankruptcy restructuring, the airline decreased total
system capacity from 53B to 30B ASMs. This equals a reduction of roughly 44%. Continental reduced
total system capacity from about 23B to 10 B ASMs between 2007 and 2010. (MIT Airline Data Project)
So it is safe to say that both carriers had already gone through a substantial network consolidation process
prior to the merger. This provides a new perspective on Delta's cuts, but other factors play a role as well.
Its five major hubs and LAX serve much stronger local markets than the majority of Delta's hubs so
maintaining a strong presence at all of them makes intuitive sense. Nonetheless, operating at least 6 major
US hubs in the long run also appears to contradict the principles of economies of scale outlined in part 1
of this analysis. The recent events in Houston and United's decision to cut capacity by 10% indicate the
possibility of a possibly downsizing the IAH hub in the face of competitive pressures and viable
alternatives at the other hubs. Whether this will take place or whether capacity cuts will ultimately take
place at one or more of the other hubs remains to be seen in the years to come as industry consolidation
continues.
97
4.2 The Demand Side - Change in UA-CO domestic passenger flows in the wake of the merger
The approach to analyzing the demand side effects of the United-Continental merger will be
identical to that used for Delta-Northwest. For this purpose, all passengers traveling on flights marketed
by United or Continental were considered. Traffic data represents snapshots from May 2010 and May
2012 to represent the situation before and after the merger based on the same time frame as the supply
side analysis in section 4.1.3
Figure 4-27: UA-CO Daily Domestic Passengers
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Compared to the substantial traffic reduction Delta experienced during its merger, United only
saw a minor decline. Figure 4-27 shows that total traffic decreased by about 4% from I11,000 per day to
about 107,000. This is small compared to Delta's 13% decline and at least partially reflects the better
economic conditions during the integration period. Nonetheless, it is clear that United also did not
maintain its traffic levels over the course of the merger and thereby appears to contradict the underlying
3 The data analyzed in this section is sourced from the US DOT 10% Ticket Sample Database that was accessed
through the Diio Mi Market Intelligence portal.
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premise of this analysis that economies of scale will allow the merging carriers to at least maintain their
pre-merger levels. The objective of this section will be to identify the reasons and to reach a conclusion
about whether this decrease could also represent the result of strategic decision similar to Delta's move to
reduce non-hub point-to-point services.
A closer look at passenger types shows an equal total decline of nonstop and I-stop passengers
between 2010 and 2012. It should be noted that nonstop passengers represent a higher share of United's
passengers both 2010 and 2012 (about 55%) than they did for Delta (about 50%). As stated in section 4.1,
United's hub structure is characterized by strong local markets that would explain this higher ratio.
Another difference from the Delta-Northwest case is that 2-stop connections increased at United from
2010 to 2012 by about 5%. The hub structure can also serve as an explanation here considering the
absence of a strong centralized hub that would ultimately facilitate 1-stop connections.
Figure 4-1 in the previous section has already shown that overall system capacity remained
virtually constant. So there is a similarity to the Delta-Northwest case in that traffic decreased more than
the aggregate change in capacity would indicate. For this reason, the approach to analyzing where these
passenger drops occurred will be identical to section 3.2 and focus on identifying patterns that could point
towards effects related to network integration.
., 2. 1 Correlation hetween schedule changes and aggregate shifis in passengers
The first step will again be to show the change in passenger flows in markets that offered nonstop
service either before or after the merger. Table 4-33 shows that only a very small number of passengers
were lost in markets where nonstop service was dropped. Instead, the most substantial fluctuations
occurred in markets where no change took place, i.e. where no nonstop service was added or removed.
This corresponds to the observations in the Delta-Northwest case with the difference that Delta's
decreases due to dropped nonstop service were much more severe. Again, these numbers can be
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interpreted as a result of shifting capacities between hubs. The fact that the numbers are much smaller
than in Delta's case aligns with the generally less significant adjustments made by United during the
merger.
Table 4-33: Change in Daily Passengers by Market Type
Table 4-34 shows the shift in 1-stop domestic connections between the hubs. While even the
largest United hubs by connecting passenger volume are much smaller than ATL, connections are
distributed fairly evenly within two groups. The key players in this segment are ORD, IAH and DEN with
around 8,000 passenger connections per day, but all have seen the number of domestic connecting
passengers decrease between 2010 and 2012. This is not surprising considering the capacity cuts affecting
these airports that are outlined in section 4.1. The second group has about 2,000 daily connecting
passengers per hub and includes the coastal hubs as well as CLE. EWR and SFO were the only hubs to
increase the number of 1-stop connecting passengers over the observed period of time.
Table 4-34: Change in daily 1-stop connections by connecting hub
1,771 8,364 2,045 " 3,250 9,270 1,839 r 9,708 2,233 38,479S1,670 7,321 2,264 r 3,073 8,384 1,687 8,469 2,656 35,523
- (101) (1,043) 219 (178) (886) (152) (1,239) 423 (2,956)
When comparing these hubs, it seems clear that the airports where domestic capacity was cut the
most (DEN, ORD and IAH) continue to function as primary connecting points for domestic traffic. This
leads to a different interpretation of capacity cuts compared to the Delta-Northwest case. Whereas Delta
downsized several hubs significantly, it appears that United cut some, potentially excess, capacity without
100
reducing the status of its domestic hubs. In order to obtain a clearer picture about these changes, the next
step will be to track the geographic shifts of passenger flows.
42.2 Geographic shifts in donstic United-Continental passenger flows
Figure 4-28 shows the change in daily nonstop passengers by destination state. The strongest
growth took place in markets to Massachusetts, Florida and the Pacific Northwest. Overall, there is no
clear geographic distribution of nonstop traffic growth that would highlight the network changes that took
place. Conversely, the largest total decline occurred in the hub states New Jersey, Texas, Colorado, Ohio
and California along with North Carolina. It should be noted that due to their large overall traffic volume,
the relative decline in the hub states other than Ohio only averaged about 2-4%. Nonetheless, the decline
is striking since not all of the hubs experienced domestic capacity cuts during this time period.
Figure 4-28: Change in Daily Nonstop Passengers by Destination (from all domestic origins)
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The changes in daily domestic 1-stop passengers exhibited in Figure 4-29 show a different
geographic pattern from the nonstop passengers. Reductions took place along both coasts and across most
of the South. At a high level, this confirms the previous observation that connections to the coasts,
particularly for cross-country services, have been cut during the integration process. But, as figure 4-28
shows, not all coastal states have seen a simultaneous increase of nonstop passengers. Connecting
passenger growth, on the other hand, has primarily affected sparsely populated states with the exception
of Massachusetts, Ohio and Texas.
Figure 4-29: Change in Daily 1-stop Passengers by Destination (from all domestic origins)
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So comparing the two types of traffic, it seems that nonstop domestic traffic has become more
important compared to 1-stop connections in a number of states. Since no reliable data is available on
international traffic, its role in the overall performance is speculative. But considering that most of the
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major gateways increased international capacity, it is possible that passengers connecting to the
international services have partially displaced nonstop local traffic. When all types of passengers are
considered, United's net traffic decreased or remained constant to most states. The most notable exception
is Massachusetts with 322 additional daily passengers in 2012. In order to identify other potential drivers
behind the passenger reduction at United, the next part of the analysis will examine the top 1,000 O-D
markets in more detail.
4. 2.3 Analvsis o/'Chanige in Top) O-D Markeis
Traffic in the top 1,000 O-D markets has also decreased as figure 4-30 shows. The relative
change is similar to that of the network as a whole at about 5% compared to the 2006 levels. So even in
its most important domestic markets, the combined airline has lost passengers over the course of the
merger. Since the United hubs represent strong local markets, markets involving hubs accounted for over
85% of this traffic in both 2010 and 2012. The reductions are evenly distributed between markets to/from
hubs and non-hub markets while intra-hub markets remained virtually unchanged.
Figure 4-30: UA-CO Top 1,000 O-D Markets (prior to merger)
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How important the local hub markets are can be seen in figures 4-31 and 4-32. The eight
domestic hubs also represent the largest O-D destinations among the top 1,000 markets. Even CLE still
has more passengers than LAS as the biggest non-hub destination. Fig. 4-31 also shows that traffic
decreased slightly at all hubs except SFO. These changes align with the shifts in available seats outlined
in section 4.1, but recall that the situation was similar at Delta despite a much more substantial hub
downsizing. This is surprising considering the effects of the recession on Delta's traffic that did not
influence performance during the United-Continental merger. So while it seems that the airline has
consolidated capacity in response to the merger, it has not been successful in retaining the passengers.
One possible explanation could be the aforementioned increase in international capacity and the potential
displacement by international connecting passengers.
Figure 4-31: Change of Daily O-D Passengers to/from Hubs
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Figure 4-32 shows that traffic at the top 15 non-hub cities has also declined with the exception of
BOS. However, none of them experienced a reduction similar to the cities in the Delta network that lost
point-to-point services during the merger.
Figure 4-32: Change of Daily O-D Passengers to/from top 15 non-hub airports
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Further evidence is provided in table 4-35, which shows the change in connecting passengers in
non-hub markets. The majority of the roughly 2,000 passengers that were lost in non-hub markets, as
exhibited in Figure 4-30, used to connect via one of the hubs. This shows that cutting point-to-point
service away from the hubs was a much smaller component in United-Continental's network integration
than at Delta-Northwest, where passenger reductions in this segment were much more substantial.
United's largest non-hub markets were and still are primarily served via its hubs. EWR and SFO grew in
this segment, but not by enough to make up for the losses accumulated by the remaining six hubs. The
decreases, in general, align with the capacity cuts outlined in section 4.1 where EWR remained virtually
constant and SFO was the only one to see domestic capacity increase.
Table 4-35: Change in connecting passengers in non-hub markets (from top 1,000 O-D markets)
(51) r(468) r40 (33) r(344) (167) r(396) r121 '(1,297)
Pr. - - - r - 0 r_ r 0 ' 0
M M (51) (468) 40 (33) (344) (167) (396) 129 (1,288)
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So the analysis of United-Continental's top 1,000 O-D markets has revealed that even these
important markets that predominantly include traffic to/from hubs have experienced similar reductions in
traffic as the rest of the network.
4.2.4 TrafLic decline exceeded capacity cuts
Despite a more favorable economic environment during the integration period, United-
Continental has also lost domestic passengers between 2010 and 2012. The decrease was more modest
than what Delta-Northwest experienced, but still appears to contradict the original assumption that
mergers will allow airlines to consolidate their networks without suffering any decreases in traffic. Both
nonstop and 1-stop traffic declined while 2-stop traffic increased slightly. Considering that United does
not focus its network on one large centralized hub, the increase of 2-stop passengers results from the
slightly different focus geographic focus of its hubs.
Traffic decreases generally align with the capacity cuts described in the previous section. The
traffic analysis also shows that the hubs affected by the strongest domestic capacity cuts remain the
dominant connection points for domestic traffic. So the cuts can be interpreted as fine-tuning the domestic
network structure in the face of the merger rather than a substantial downsizing like at Delta. The
analysis has also revealed that dropped nonstop services also accounted for only a very minor reduction in
traffic. Since the decreases in traffic have also affected the top O-D markets in United's network, the
airline has clearly failed to integrate without negative effects on its market share.
106
- u,3Simm1niarv Reduction in ira/fic despite constant system capacity hints at exogenous or other neltork
cffcts
United-Continental's merger has been very different compared to the Delta-Northwest case in
terms of capacity changes. Total system ASMs have remained virtually constant between 2010 and 2012.
However, there has been a shift from domestic to international capacity at a number of hubs. This also
highlights another key difference with the Delta-Northwest merger. Whereas the combined Delta
downsized a number of its hubs to the point of disbanding them all together, United does not appear to
abandon any of its hubs. Almost all of them saw capacity increase or remain at a high level. DEN lost
substantial international capacity but remains one of the primary domestic connecting points and CLE
already played a very minor role before the merger. Similar to Delta-Northwest, the share of regional
partners in terms of frequencies and capacity also increased in United's network during the merger. Prior
to the merger, however, United already relied on these carriers to a much greater extent than Delta so this
shift represents a continuation of this policy.
As Section 4.2 has shown, United was unable to increase or even maintain its traffic over the
course of the merger. The fact that the traffic decline has affected all hubs as well as the top O-D markets
in the network indicates that underlying causes have influenced the network as a whole. Though
reductions generally align with capacity decreases, it is clear that the airline has failed to capitalize on the
merger synergies at least over the time frame used for this analysis. Considering that the recession had
ended by the time the merger was announced, exogenous economic effects cannot be used to explain this
shortfall in the way they did for Delta. As stated above, a possible explanation could be derived from the
shift towards international capacity and the facilitated connections via the new hubs. International traffic
was not part of this analysis, but it would have displaced some of United's domestic traffic since domestic
capacity has decreased slightly at the same time. Another possible reason could also be the airline's poor
operational performance during the integration period that might have turned passengers away. A series
of computer glitches and generally poor on-time performance during this time caused inconveniences for
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customers and were well publicized to a point where United's image could have suffered. (Mouawad
2012)
While network consolidation in the case of United-Continental was not as extensive and clear-cut
as with Delta and Northwest, the network changes exhibit some of the characteristics to exploit
economies of scale outlined at the beginning of this analysis. Downsizing international capacity at DEN
and growing it at the coastal hubs in particular represents such a measure along with growing intra-hub
capacity. Compared to the changes at Delta, however, the adjustments at United were minor. For the
moment, the integration represents a combination of the two networks with marginal adjustments. The
recent cuts at IAH show that more substantial shifts could still occur in the future so the network
integration was not complete as of May 2012. Time will also show whether the reductions in domestic
traffic were only temporary and due to the issues during the integration process.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
The premise of this analysis has been to test the assumption that airlines can exploit economies of
scale and scope after a merger by consolidating their networks while maintaining or increasing their
traffic levels. For this purpose, the two most recently concluded mergers of major American carriers,
United-Continental and Delta-Northwest, were analyzed from a supply and demand perspective. The
analysis has revealed a number of substantial differences between the two cases that show how airline
mergers can take very different shapes with regards to network structure depending on the
complementarity of the individual networks. Yet there are also similarities that can help to answer more
general questions about airline mergers.
When contrasting the results of Sections 3.1 and 4. 1, we can see the different paths that Delta-
Northwest and United-Continental have taken on the supply side to integrate their respective networks.
On an aggregate level, the most notable difference is that Delta-Northwest cut total system capacity as
measured in ASMs while this metric has remained virtually constant at United-Continental. A closer look
at how capacity changes have affected the respective airlines' hubs shows an even more drastic
difference. In the case of Delta-Northwest, we have seen clear capacity consolidation at the major hubs
with ATL now accounting for over 40% of total system capacity. At the same time, Delta has downsized
a number of hubs, primarily CVG and MEM, and cut point-to-point services bypassing the hubs. So
overall, there is clear evidence that the combined airline is pursuing a consolidation strategy to reduce or
eliminate redundant hubs and strengthen its primary hubs to exploit the economies of scale and scope
outlined in Section 1.
United-Continental, on the other hand, has pursued a different strategy. While some capacity
shifts have taken place, the role of its domestic hubs within the network remained relatively unchanged.
Other than a reduction of international capacity at DEN, no downsizing has taken place at any of the hubs
while the majority of hubs has seen a shift to more international capacity. A closer look at the original
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networks of the two carriers involved in each merger provides a possible explanation for these different
approaches. Delta already operated a large centralized hub at ATL whereas United and Continental
merged two networks with several hubs of roughly equal size.
Furthermore, the geographical distribution of the United-Continental hubs is very different from
that operated by Delta-Northwest. The hubs that saw the most substantial downsizing, MEM and CVG,
are located within a few hundred miles of much larger hubs and therefore became more or less redundant
as the hub density increased in a combined network. United-Continental, on the other hand, operates hubs
with a much larger geographic spread and therefore, experienced less overlap once the networks were
integrated. Even the hubs that are relatively close to each other, such as EWR-IAD and SFO-LAX, were
in a better position to survive since they serve large local markets as well, which can not be said for
MEM, CVG or SLC. Instead, Delta has also focused capacity at major local markets by building up
substantial capacity at both JFK and LGA.
These results show that network integration of major legacy carriers operating multiple hubs can take
a variety of shapes depending on several factors like:
1. The original size of the hubs
2. The geographic location of the hubs with respect to each other
3. Whether the hub is also serving a major local market
Differences concerning these three points provide part of the explanation why both carriers have
chosen different paths to pursue the network revenue effects outlined in Part 1 of this analysis. The other
factor distinguishing the two cases is timing. As stated in Section 3-1, Delta and Northwest completed
their integration during the recession and capacity was cut across the industry over the same period of
time. So the combination of its initial network characteristics and the exogenous economic effects provide
a reason for why Delta-Northwest cut total system capacity while United-Continental maintained their
previous levels after significant capacity reductions during the years leading up to the merger.
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Nonetheless, the two mergers display a number of similarities that are aimed to realize cost and
revenue effects described in the introduction. Both Delta-Northwest and United-Continental have
increased the share of domestic flights operated by regional partners. The share of these partners at the
respective hubs also aligns with the relative importance of the hub in the network. Downsized or minor
hubs like MEM and CLE show a much higher share of regional carrier flights than international gateways
like EWR or ATL. In both cases, it is clear that the airlines sought to benefit from the better cost
structures offered by regional partners and reduce capacity by utilizing their smaller aircraft.
Another similarity can be found in the growing intra-hub traffic in both networks. This trend clearly
shows the effort to maximize the number of available O-D markets served and the number of available
frequencies offered by the combined carriers. As stated at the beginning of this thesis, these metrics
provide good indicators for the quality of service in a market and should help the airline to increase its
market share.
While it has been shown that the strategies used in both mergers were designed to take advantage of
cost and revenue economies of scale, the analysis has also revealed that neither of the airlines has
succeeded in growing or maintaining its traffic over the same period of time. Both airlines saw their total
traffic decrease over the periods analyzed: Delta-Northwest by 13% and United-Continental by 4%.
Recall that United-Continental did not reduce its capacity while Delta's total system capacity shrank by
only 10%. Although this appears to contradict the underlying assumption of this analysis, a number of
external factors need to be considered when evaluating these changes. Delta and Northwest merged
during a prolonged recession that had negative effects on airline traffic worldwide. United-Continental,
on the other hand, experienced several operational problems including computer system failures and poor
on-time performance that turned away customers. From the data used in this analysis, we cannot
determine the magnitude of these effects on reducing traffic. But some negative consequences are likely,
particularly in the case of Delta-Northwest and the recession where traffic decline was strongest in the
geographic areas with the lowest average rates of economic growth.
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The more detailed analysis of traffic patterns in Sections 3.2 and 4.2 has also revealed trends that
ultimately align with the theories of network consolidation as well as economies of scale and scope. Delta
lost a significant number of passengers in markets where point-to-point services were abandoned or
reduced. Strategically, removing these services and routing them via the major hubs would provide
precisely the scale and scope advantages that we have identified as the objective of network integration.
Within the time frame of the analysis., Delta has not been able to recover these passengers on its
connecting services but further study of the traffic patterns from 2010 onwards is needed to determine
whether such a shift simply requires a longer time frame. The relatively small decline in connecting
markets compared to nonstop already points to similar effects reflecting the increased reliance on Delta's
major hubs.
Section 4.2 showed that United-Continental recorded decreasing domestic traffic across the board
including in its largest O-D markets. Due to the absence of reliable data on international passengers, it is
not possible to determine with certainty whether more lucrative international passengers have also
replaced domestic passengers. But the clear tendency in the network with international capacity growth
from virtually all of the hubs provides a good indicator that international traffic will likely be increasing
as well. Considering the simultaneous decline in domestic capacity, the logical conclusion would be that
the relative share of international traffic in United-Continental's network is increasing. Further study
based on proprietary airline data would be needed in this area to confirm this theory.
To sum up, the analysis of the two most recently concluded major airline mergers in the United States
has confirmed the theoretical framework with regards to the supply side while the demand effects remain
inconclusive. In both cases, network integration has increased size and scope of operations at the major
hubs within the constraints set by the original independent networks. So it is safe to speak of
consolidated networks where strengths have been amplified and redundancies have, at least to some
degree, been reduced. Within the time frame covered by the analysis, both of the new combined carriers
have been unable to return to their pre-merger traffic levels. The analysis did not consider the general
112
effects of increased capacity discipline on the US airline industry or the development of average fares
during this process. Additional research is needed to determine whether the decrease in traffic primarily
represented low-fare passengers that did not have a major impact on the airlines' bottom line.
In addition to the influence of exogenous factors on traffic described in previous sections, another
possible explanation could lie in the time frame of the analysis. Two years after the conclusion of its
merger, Delta Airlines reported a $1.6 billion profit for 2012 and expects "solid improvement" for 2013
and the merger is widely considered to be a great success story. (Reuters) So an expanded time frame
beyond the technical completion of a merger could lead to very different results with regards to post-
merger traffic. Considering a longer time frame would not only limit the effects of singular exogenous
factors on the results but also account for a possible delay in the passenger response to the "new" airline.
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